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INTRODUCTION
Among the most written-about topics in administrative and constitutional
law these days is "privatization," an area that in a relatively short time has
spawned an immense body of literature. The work has become so
prevalent and has so captivated the attention of leading thinkers in these
areas that its conception of the nature of governance-its portrait of
"privatizing" arrangements as the key focus of concern in understanding
our allegedly changing political institutions-has the potential to define the
academic lawyer's very understanding of government. Unfortunately, as it
will be the purpose of this Article to show, it is also fairly problematic.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. I welcome all feedback at
csagers@law.csuohio.edu. Because working out the ideas in this paper has had a bit of the
flavor of a torchless search for the way out of a damp echoing cave, it was possible only
with the occasionally searing and immensely appreciated feedback of Ben Barton, Anita
Bernstein, Cary Coglianese, Errol Meidinger, Pierre Schlag, Frank Snyder, Paul Verkuil,
and Phil Weiser.
HeinOnline  -- 59 Admin. L. Rev. 37 2007
ADMINISTRATIVE LA wREVIEW
One central criticism drives this Article: The very idea that there is such
a thing as "privatization" and that it is a meaningful subject of study
implies a sociological claim, which may seem obvious and unexceptional,
but in fact is importantly mistaken. It implies that there is some distinction
between the performance of certain functions by government institutions
and performance by private ones, and it implies that the distinction is both
real and of very deep significance. A purpose of this Article is to show that
this distinction does not exist, and that by employing it, the literature has
described the world in an inaccurate way. To that extent this Article joins
with critiques of conceptual public-private dichotomies that have been a
part of academic criticism for at least 150 years,' though I hope it will add
something new and worthwhile to them. Importantly, though, this Article
is not an exercise in legal doctrine. It is ultimately an attempt to suggest an
alternative sociological picture of institutions of control. That is, the
purpose is not simply to deconstruct the public-private distinction as a tool
used by courts, policymakers, and law professors, but to offer a picture of
governance that can get along without it.
In short, I hope to show that the basic choice in the organization of
society is not between organization by government bureaucracy on one
hand, and markets on the other-a choice that is assumed in the
privatization literature. Rather, the basic choice is between two kinds of
bureaucracy, which really do not differ much at all. Indeed, the chief
difference seems to be that one of them lacks even a nominal obligation
toward the public interest.
While I believe the real problem in the literature is a deep conceptual
one, it begins superficially as a problem of definition. Though it is not
often explicitly defined, "privatization" normally means, roughly, some
conscious choice by an entity of traditional "government" to provide a
service or good by enlisting the aid of an entity that is not part of traditional
"government." As a concept it appears to find its origin in a popular article
by Peter Drucker from the late 1960s.2 From there, it found its way into
1. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the public-
private critique).
2. See Peter F. Drucker, The Sickness of Government, 14 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1969).
Drucker, a business school professor and management consultant, argued that structural
features inherent in government made it competent only to "focus the political energies of
society[,] ... to dramatize issues[,] [and] ... to present fundamental choices," id. at 17,
whereas all other goods-and-services provisions then being performed by government
should be "reprivatized" to the "new, nongovernmental institutions that.., sprang up and
[grew]" during the twentieth century, id. at 17-18. In such a model, government would
remain "the central, the top institution," but would only preside over the actual performance
of social functions by private entities, like an orchestral "conductor." Though
"reprivatization" in Drucker's mind is not a question of "ownership" in the literal sense of
which organizations should own the relevant productive assets, he nevertheless saw "a
special role [for] business .... Id. at 17-23. Drucker's paper is strewn with anecdotal
[59:1
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any number of guru-esque management bestsellers 3 and advocacy-oriented
government reports,4 though it has an important antecedent in a policy
begun in the Eisenhower Administration.5
In any event, this new literature largely considers "privatization" to be a
legally formalistic phenomenon. It is accomplished by deliberate
delegation of authority, in the form of some legal instrument (a government
contract, a regulation, a statute, perhaps the creation of some free-standing
nominally private entity, or some less formal policy instrument) by a
formally constituted entity of traditional government.
On one hand, the instinct driving this large literature seems obviously
correct. Incidences in which traditionally defined government acquires a
good or service from nominally private sources occur in numbers and in
ways that are fascinating and perhaps alarming (and perhaps occur more
frequently now, as is generally claimed in the privatization literature), and
they should be part of legal academic inquiries into the nature of
contemporary governance. But the larger significance of those transactions
probably is not very well captured in the literature because of its formalistic
model and the assumption it implies of fundamental differences between
"traditional government" and "private" entities. The problem with a
formalistic approach is that the literature's ultimate goal is, or ought to be,
claims in support of his argument about government failings, and about the managerial
superiority of "private" or "autonomous" institutions, but beyond that he gives little actual
proof other than his own opinions.
Of course, the deeper theme in Drucker's paper-that private trade and business
associations serve the public interest better than government-was already a century old in
1969, however much he might imply that it was a new idea. Sanctification of private
enterprise and aspirations for a private associative state go back at least to the
mid-nineteenth century in the United States, and were dominant in public policy between
the turn of the twentieth century and the New Deal. See infra note 64.
3. In recent times the best known of these was DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR (1992), a book that fueled a furor for privatization and making government
more "business-like" throughout the last four presidential administrations.
4. Several of the best known reports were released during the Reagan Administration.
See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ENHANCING GOVERNMENTAL PRODUCTIVITY
THROUGH COMPETITION: A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT TO
PROVIDE QUALITY GOVERNMENT AT LEAST COST (1988); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988).
5. See BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, BULLETIN 55-4 (1955) ("[T]he Federal Government
will not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own
use if such product or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary
business channels."). The policy is still in force, and is now contained in OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-76: PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (2003). It has been
the subject of no small controversy. The fact that "privatization" has this long lineage,
which in some minds lends it legitimacy, has not been lost on recent administrations. See,
e.g., Letter from David H. Safavian, Administrator, Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
to Richard B. Cheney, President of the Senate (Jan. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/comp-src/fy2004_summary-rpt.pdf (reporting
the status of the current President's "competitive sourcing" program, and noting that its
origins lie in Eisenhower policy from 1955).
2007]
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to understand social phenomena as they exist, and those phenomena are not
necessarily well characterized by the law's own distinctions and
definitions. In short, while the literature is content to study one
comparatively small set of transactions in which entities of traditional
"government" engage, the bulk of the important choices in our society are
made by a whole world of institutions6 that are not entities of traditionally
constituted "government., 7 To try to understand it only by looking into
legally formal delegations of particular functions leads to a narrow and
metonymical picture of social governance, and seems also likely to produce
shallow historiographical explanations.
This Article is accordingly an exercise akin to the "new institutionalism"
in the social sciences of late, insofar as its basic critique is that the literature
fails to model or try to understand the range of institutions that arrange
social phenomena, as those institutions actually exist. 8 The literature
6. For the most part I will use "institution" in a narrow sense, which may seem
somewhat prosaic. I normally will use it to mean more or less formally organized
associations of persons. I frequently will make reference to the very large range of more or
less formal, more or less bureaucratic organizations in American society that have some
power to engage in behavior that allocates social values. These entities include standard
setting bodies, product design consortia, large corporations with respect to their personnel
policies and large scale purchase and sales planning, law reform and policy advisory bodies,
nominally "private" universities, non-profit corporations and unincorporated societies,
churches, large voluntary social or professional organizations, and so on. I do this because
the whole point of this Article is to show that not only is "privatization" not new or
especially interesting, but for a long time American society has been virtually unique in the
degree to which its important decisions have been in the hands of non-"government"
bureaucracies. Thus, for the most part I will not much discuss other "institutions" that have
influence in the arrangement of society, like custom or ethnicity. However, for an excellent
critical review of the use of the term and its generally broader meaning in the social
sciences, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Insitutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism, in
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 143 (Walter W. Powell & Paul
J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM]. In any case, this world
of essentially formal governance institutions to which I make reference is explored in a
substantial secondary literature. See generally SAMUEL N. KRISLOV, How NATIONS CHOOSE
PRODUCT STANDARDS AND STANDARDS CHANGE NATIONS (1997); HARM SCHEPEL, THE
CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE (2005); Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity
and Standard Setting Organizations: A Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25
CARDOzO L. REV. 1393, 1398-1402 (2004) [hereinafter Sagers, Case Study] (discussing the
prevalence and influence of a class of nominally private regulatory entities known as
"standard setting organizations"); Christopher L. Sagers, The Legal Structure of American
Freedom and the Provenance of the Antitrust Immunities, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 927, 951-57
[hereinafter Sagers, Legal Structure] (discussing means by which nominally private entities
can allocate social values in ways indistinguishable from "government").
7. A difficult problem in this Article is the awkwardness of referring to entities that are
"public" or "governmental," and those that are "private" or "non-governmental," since a
major purpose is to show that distinctions between these terms are illusions and distractions
from meaningful social inquiry. Thus, this Article uses terms such as "traditional
government" or "nominally private" or the like, which indicate only the everyday meaning
given such terms in legal discourse. The terms have no value for my purposes as
descriptions of actual sociological reality, but only as descriptions of how people commonly
think of that reality.
8. A very good summary of which is in Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio,
Introduction, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 6, at 1.
[59:1
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concerns itself almost exclusively with a narrow class of formal
transactions and the discrete doctrinal problems they are thought to pose.
These are the sorts of problems that other social sciences have overcome
(or at least recognized and attempted to address). 9
This Article aspires to a few discrete goals. First, it will show that the
concept of "privatization" and the public-private divide on which it is based
are not meaningful and cannot guide academic inquiry. Importantly, this
argument is not simply about academic method. The public-private
distinction plays an important legitimating role in society and its use not
only frustrates academic inquiry, it also conceals prevalent and very
significant maldistributions of power. In any case, as will be explained at
length below, deconstructing this distinction in this context will require two
steps. First, the distinction as a jurisprudential proposition-a claim that
the public and private sectors can be meaningfully conceptualized and
distinguished-must be taken apart and seen for what it is: a normative
commitment or aspiration that lacks moral or sociological content and
tends to disguise disparities in freedom and power. But the distinction as it
appears in the privatization literature also implies an economic argument:
Provision of services in "markets"-that is, services provided under the
pressures and incentives thought to characterize the "private" sector-will
be quite different than functions performed by government. This argument
also turns out to be problematic.
As a second major goal, this Article will argue that without concepts of
public and private to define itself, study of "privatization" can be seen as
simply one aspect of a much larger body of work. This is so in two
respects. On one hand, it turns out that a large and diverse range of
scholarship in one way or another relates to the private doing seemingly
public things and, therefore, even though no one may really think of it in
this way, it really ought to be thought of as part of the same endeavor as
"privatization." But a whole range of other work, going well back into the
nineteenth century, happens to address the same broad issues of institutions
of social control, even though it may be unconcerned with any discrete set
9. This Article therefore also finds company among the so-called "realists" of the
founding generation of modem political science, whose chief endeavor was to see beyond
the legally formalistic distinctions in which the study of government had been bound. See
generally David Easton, Political Science, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 282, 289-90 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (describing the change from legally
formalistic to more holistic subjects of research during the late nineteeth century); Martin
Landau, The Myth of Hyperfactualism in the Study of American Politics, 83 POL. SCI. Q.
378, 380-82 (1968) (describing the "realists"). As Easton says, a key development in this
transition in political science was to insist "upon the need to abandon the habit of attributing
causation to ideas and legal norms .... Easton, supra, at 290.
20071
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of government transactions. Finally and most importantly, this Article
concludes with a proposal for the sociological imagery with which the
range of social control institutions might be better understood.
1. THE EXISTING "PRIVATIZATION" LITERATURE AND CERTAIN
PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS
Perhaps the great scholarly interest in "privatization" reflects the recent
zeal for it by politicians of all persuasions.'0 For instance, President
George W. Bush began his first administration by promising no less than
"[to ... rethink [all of] government,"'1 and proposed privatization as a
major tool for it. 12  No doubt scholarly concern also reflects the fairly
brazen nature of some privatizing arrangements. We now have for-profit
prisons whose owners are publicly traded corporations, and for-profit
armies whose employees patrol, secure, interrogate, and kill foreign
citizens, all while wearing U.S. deputy stars. Of all things, we came close
to scrapping the National Weather Service in favor of a wholly private, for-
profit system of weather information. 13 On its surface, in other words, the
landscape of governance by nominally private institutions is gripping as
much for those entities' power and ubiquity as for the fact that, to most
Americans, they are all but invisible.
Most academics seem to think this "privatization" is happening much
more than it once did. Many are fairly alarmed by it, though quite a few
think that with appropriate corrections in policy or legal doctrine it can be
harnessed as a force for good, and one that is well suited to our assertedly
New Economy. Above all, virtually everyone seems convinced that it is
new and that it is very important.
10. "Privatization" agendas are hardly unpartisan, as they are often thought to be. See
infra note 93 and accompanying text.
11. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA FISCAL
YEAR 2002, at 3 (2001) [hereinafter "BUSH MANAGEMENT AGENDA"].
12. He said it could help government harness the power of "innovation through
competition." Id. at 4. Indeed, with a somehow endearing gumption the President explained
that all of federal government reform could be "guided" by only "three principles"--that
"Government should be: citizen-centered, not bureaucracy-centered; results-oriented; [and]
market-based, actively promoting rather than stifling innovation through competition." Id.
13. In 2005, Senator Santorum of Pennsylvania introduced a bill that, while it would
have preserved the Service, would have prohibited it from providing any information in
competition with commercial information providers. See National Weather Services Duties
Act of 2005, S. 786, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); Maeve Reston, Santorum Criticizes Weather
Service, Has Sponsored Bill to Prevent Government Weather Notices, to Benefit Private
Companies, Including Donor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 2005, at A6, available
at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05253/569133.stm. Critics noted that a significant
Santorum campaign contributor was a private weather information provider, and that still it
would be taxpayer dollars generating weather information that would then become the sole
re-saleable property of private companies. Id.
[59:1
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A. The Literature as It Exists
The resulting literature now includes a huge number of law journal
articles, 14 quite a few of which are very long,' 5 as well as an unusual
number of law journal symposia 16 and many books. 17  Whether or not
"privatization" is new, this literature to a large extent truly is-much of it
dates from no earlier than 1990, and a surge of it began in about 2000,
14. For a survey of which, see infra notes 22-41 and accompanying text. While by its
nature this Article, for better or worse, must indulge in a certain sin-really long string-cite
footnotes-it will make no attempt to list all the articles that have appeared, an effort that
could itself consume a short law review article. Suffice it to say that there have been a lot.
Online database searches identify several thousand articles that use the words "privatize" or
"privatization" and more than 600 that contain these words in their titles.
15. Several of the leading articles in the area are in excess of 100 pages, for example,
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (132
pages); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003)
(135 pages); and many of them are more than fifty pages.
16. See Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211
(2003); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003)
(exploring the economics of privatization for government agencies); Symposium, New
Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687
(2002) (explaining the need for a reconceptualization of administrative law due to
globalization); Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy
in the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307 (2001) (exploring the means by
which government should fulfill its functions effectively and efficiently); Agnes P. Dover,
Single Subject Issue, Privatization and Outsourcing, 30 PUB. CONTRACT L.J. 551 (2001);
Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administative Law, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, New Administrative Law] (exploring the
new direction of administrative law in the face of privatization); Symposium,
Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalization, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063 (2000)
(describing the effects of privatization in a globalized world); Project, Privatization: The
Global Scale-Back of Government Involvement in National Economics, 48 ADMIN. L. REV.
435 (1996) (surveying privatization efforts around the globe); Symposium, Comparative
Models of Privatization: Paradigms and Politics, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995); Ronald A.
Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 449 (1988) (exploring the
possible challenges and benefits of privatization); see also Symposium, Association of
American Law Schools: Private Parties as Defendants in Civil Rights Litigation, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2004) (describing the need to address civil rights violations by private
entities in the post-September 11 th world).
17. See, e.g., BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND
COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1998) (discussing privatization of prisons); TIMOTHY
BESLEY & MAITREESH GHATAK, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE PROVISION OF
PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND AN APPLICATION TO NGOs (1999); PIERRE GUISLAIN, THE
PRIVATIZATION CHALLENGE: A STRATEGIC, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (1997); JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE:
THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE (2000) (exploring the history of privately owned public
space in New York City); MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY-SIDE, DEMAND-SIDE,
UPSIDE AND DOWNSIDE (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002) (focusing on
accountability as a method of maintaining good governance); MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS,
NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (2002) (discussing the phenomenon of
public money funding private entities, such as private schools); OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra
note 3 (exploring the need to reinvent government by focusing on the specific causes of
poor governance); ELLIOTT D. SCLAR, You DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE
ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION (2000); THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Michael
Taggart ed., 1997) (discussing privatization as a result of worldwide export of economic
liberalism).
2007]
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perhaps in response to campaign rhetoric of that year.18 This literature
extends throughout a variety of social science fields, and it is especially
voluminous in law. It is useful for its collection of a large amount of
sociological raw data-namely, a large collection of individual instances of
conscious choices by government entities to provide some good or service
through a non-government entity. The literature is mostly subject-matter
specific. That is, each individual book or article normally focuses on the
conscious government choice to perform some specific function through a
nominally private entity. Much of the work has focused on contracting out
welfare and other social services,1 9 health care,2° law enforcement and
corrections,2' military functions,22  and sometimes seemingly more
18. Of the law journal articles identified in online database searches, see supra note 16,
nearly 200 have appeared since 2000, and nearly all have appeared since 1990. A large
number of books have also appeared in that time. See, e.g., supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty
Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739 (2002) (exploring private, faith-based initiatives that
replace public welfare programs); Marsha B. Freeman, Privatization of Child Protective
Services: Getting the Lion Back in the Cage?, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 449 (2003); Michelle Estrin
Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001)
(explaining how privatization of some aspects of welfare created accountability on the part
of its recipients); Kathryn L. Moore, The Effects of Partial Privatization of Social Security
Upon Private Pensions, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1255 (2001) (exploring the effect of
partial privatization of the social security system on private pensions); Dru Stevenson,
Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
83 (2003) (discussing the discretion given to each agency to decide which services will be
privatized and why); Luke Andrew Steven Demaree, Note, "Tiny Little Shoes:" The
Privatization of Child Welfare Services in Kansas, 69 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 643 (2001)
(summarizing the effect of privatization of child welfare services on the quality of that
service).
20. See, e.g., Sarah S. Bachman, Why Do States Privatize Mental Health Services? Six
State Experiences, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 807 (1996); David M. Frankford,
Privatizing Health Care: Economic Magic to Cure Legal Medicine, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1992) (proposing that it is not useful to assess legal regulation of health care through a
model of market competition); Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The
Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345 (2003)
(discussing the role of non-profit hospitals in providing services required by law and
morality); Ronald L. Wisor, Jr., Community Care, Competition and Coercion: A Legal
Perspective on Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J. L. & MED. 145 (1993) (exploring
the possibility of privatization of mental health care providing better health care at a lower
cost with a legal system that holds patient autonomy in high regard).
21. See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 17; JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION:
PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 150-78 (1989) (taking prison privatization as a case study);
Alfred C. Aman, Privatization, Prisons, Democracy and Human Rights: The Need to Extend
the Province of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 511 (2005) (addressing
how administrative law in the United States can be used to correct human rights violations
that arise from privatization, especially in the prison context); David Del Fiandra, Comment,
The Growth of Prison Privatization and the Threat Posed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 DuQ. L.
REV. 591 (2000) (exploring the effect of § 1983 on the expansion of privatized prisons); Dan
M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner
City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859 (1999) ("[P]rivatization... is essential to the future
effectiveness of criminal law in our most crime-ridden communities, where it's clear that the
state has neither an authoritative moral voice nor a monopoly on force, legitimate or
otherwise."); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004). Mark N. Ohrenberger, Note,
[59:1
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mundane functions.23 Some privatization writers have been especially
concerned about private performance of seemingly inherent government
functions, such as adjudication 24 and policymaking, whether through
Prison Privatization and the Development of "Good Faith" Defense for Private-Party
Defendants to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Actions, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1009 (2005)
(advocating a good faith defense to § 1983 actions).
22. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic,
and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1001 (2005); Steven L.
Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a
Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 549 (2005) (discussing the
effect of the Abu Ghraib scandal on the success of privatization); P. W. Singer, War, Profits
and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 521 (2004) (exploring the effect of privatized military firms on the way the
United States conducts war); Nathaniel Stinnett, Note, Regulating the Privatization of War:
How to Stop Private Military Firms From Committing Human Rights Abuses, 28 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 211 (2005) (noting that the goal of privatizing military functions is to
respond to the demand for temporary, highly-specialized military services).
23. See, e.g., KAYDEN, supra note 17; Dan Kramer, How Airport Noise and Airport
Privatization Effect [sic] Economic Development in Communities Surrounding U.S.
Airports, 31 TRANSP. L.J. 213 (2004); Darrell A. Fruth, Note, Economic and Institutional
Constraints on the Privatization of Government Information Technology Services, 13 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 521 (2000). One interesting vein is an ongoing debate among military lawyers
about privatizing military base housing and utilities. See, e.g., Maj. Jeff A. Bovamick, Can
a Commander Authorize Searches & Seizures in Privatized Housing Areas?, 181 MIL. L.
REV. 1 (2004); Philip D. Morrison, State Property Tax Implications for Military Privatized
Housing Program, 56 AIR FORCE L. REV. 261 (2005); Jeffrey A. Renshaw, Utility
Privatization in the Military Services: Issues, Problems and Potential Solutions, 53 AIR
FORCE L. REV. 55 (2002); Stacie A. Remie Vest, Military Housing Privatization Initiative:
A Guidance Document for Wading Through the Legal Morass, 53 AIR FORCE L. REV. 1
(2002). To say that these matters seem mundane definitely does not mean that they are.
Often the very obscurity of particular policies renders them doubly pernicious. Privatization
as a proposed solution to shortages of water for human use, for example, is a matter that
many authors see as a looming global crisis. Of special recent concern have been fears that
corporate entities, if entrusted with water distribution, would have incentives at odds with
the public good and in particular would disserve the needs of third-world populations, a
debate that largely began with the privatized water experiment of the government Chile in
the 1980s. See CARL J. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT: PRIVATIZATION, WATER MARKETS,
AND THE STATE IN CHILE (1998). The Chilean experiment and other water privatization has
been the subject of numerous legal works. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold,
Privatization of Public Water Services: The States' Role in Assuring Public Accountability,
32 PEPP. L. REV. 561 (2005); David J. Hayes, Privatization and Control of U.S. Water
Supplies, 18 NAT. RES. & ENV. 19 (2003); Jennifer Naegele, What Is Wrong With Full-
Fledged Water Privatization?, 6 J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 99 (2004); Robert Vitale, Privatizing
Water Systems: A Primer, 24 FORD. INT'L L.J. 1382 (2001); Matthew S. Tisdale, Note, The
Price of Thirst: The Trend Towards the Privatization of Water and Its Effect on Private
Water Rights, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 535 (2004).
24. See, e.g., Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business and
Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 Ky. L. REV. 183 (2000);
Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and the Civil
Justice System, 9 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 578 (2000); Steven J. Eagle, Privatizing Urban
Land Use Regulation: The Problem of Consent, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 905 (1999); Susan
D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); Margaret L.
Moses, Privatized "Justice," 36 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 535 (2005); Steven J. Ware, Default
Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703
(1999).
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advisory consulting services, 25 drafting model codes, 26 or regulating
directly through standard setting and certification.27 Political trends also
periodically focus attention on particular matters, like the privatization of
Social Security2 8 or education.29 Finally, a number of articles have focused
on special, doctrinal problems of privatized functions, like whether
privately promulgated codes can be copyrighted,3° whether private code-
makers should enjoy antitrust immunity, 31 or whether delegates of public
32functions should be subject to open government statutes.
25. See, e.g., DANIEL GUTTMAN & BARRY WILLNER, THE SHADOW GOVERNMENT
(1976); Paul R. Verkuil, The Nondelegable Duty to Govern (Cardozo Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 149, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=871455.
26. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform
Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83
(1983); Seven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process
of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9,
80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994); David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371
(2003).
27. Strictly speaking, people writing about standards and certification do not normally
conceive their project as involving "privatization," and "privatization" scholars normally
give little thought to standard setting. Presumably this is so because standard setting
frequently occurs without any overt, de jure appointment by governments of standard setting
bodies. In any case, the rise of private consortia and trade groups in high technology
industries have fueled interest in this area, particularly in antitrust and intellectual property.
Standard setting and its various problems are detailed extensively in two exceptionally
thoughtful and comprehensive recent books: KRiSLOV, supra note 6, and SCHEPEL, supra
note 6.
28. See, e.g., Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality
of Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REv. 975 (2000); Richard L. Kaplan, Enron,
Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2004) (arguing that
the Enron disaster helped derail attempts at Social Security privatization); Kathryn L.
Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on Women, Minorities,
and Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341 (2000). See generally Symposium, Public
Policy for Retirement Security in the 21st Century: Assuring the Future of Social Security:
Privatization and Other Reforms, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2004).
29. See MINOW, supra note 17, at 1; Lewis D. Solomon, Edison Schools and the
Privatization of K-12 Public Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 30 FORD. URB. L.J.
1281 (2003). See generally Symposium, The Educational Divide: Gauging the Impact of
Legal Challenges to School Vouchers and Parental Choice on America's Children, 45 How.
L.J. 247 (2001); David J. D'Agata, Comment, School Privatization and Student Rights: A
Comparison of Canadian and American Law Regarding Searches and Seizures Conducted
in Privatized Schools, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 314 (2003) (explaining the legal
implications of school privatization in the context of searches and seizures).
30. See, e.g., Katie M. Colendich, Who Owns "the Law"? The Effect on Copyrights
When Privately-Authored Works Are Adopted or Incorporated by Reference Into Law, 78
WASH. L. REV. 589 (2003); Shubha Ghosh, Copyright as Privatization: The Case of Model
Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653 (2004); Daniel J. Russell, Note, Veeck v. Southern Building
Code Congress International, Inc.: Invalidating the Copyright of Model Codes Upon Their
Enactment into Law, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 131 (2003).
31. See Sagers, Case Study, supra note 6.
32. See, e.g., Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An
Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21
(1999).
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Most of this literature concerns privatizing policies of the United States
federal and state governments. This is not really parochialism, because
"privatization" in the United States is in some sense different than
"privatization" in most of the rest of the world.33 However, a subset of the
literature takes a comparative approach 34 or focuses purely on privatizing in
foreign regions. 35  Finally, not all work in this area is subject-specific.
Some takes a more abstract, theoretical view,36 though often the articles
generalize mainly by collecting more than one subject-specific case study.37
While this literature is often as much journalistic as it is theoretical or
constructive, it normally offers some suggestion for legislative or case law
correction. Most of the policy-talk, oddly enough, begins with a
presumption in favor of the status quo. Even the more careful analyses
tend to take the current state of public-private relations-and even
33. Namely, in most other places extensive state ownership of industry was common
until at least the mid-twentieth century, and therefore "privatization" in most of the world
literally means the transfer of state-owned assets to non-state entities. This obviously is the
case in the former Soviet states, but is so even in Western Europe, a result of the early
twentieth century success of socialist political programs, which only began to unravel in
recent decades. In the United States, by contrast, government entities have almost never
directly owned productive assets and have controlled significant industrial functions only in
times of war. Therefore, "privatization" here can only mean the giving away of seemingly
governmentalfunctions. See generally DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 5-7.
34. See, e.g., Kristen V. Campana, Comment, Paying Our Own Way: The Privatization
of the Chilean Social Security System and Its Lessons for American Reform, 20 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 385 (1999).
35. See, e.g., BESLEY & GHATAK, supra note 17; GuISLAIN, supra note 17; Bernard
Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1731 (2000); Lisa Philips, Taxing the
Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 J.L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (2000) (discussing "privatizing" effects and their impact on
Canadian tax policy).
36. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 4; Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of
Government: The Private Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
165, 167 (1989); Freeman, New Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 816 (urging that
administrative law scholarship broaden its focus from delegation and agency legitimacy,
which prevents those in the legal profession from appreciating the extent of private
participation in governance and grappling with its implications for democracy); Dan
Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and Choice,
33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321 (2004) [hereinafter Guttman, Governance by Contract]; Sheila S.
Kennedy, When Is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-
Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 203 (2001) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Private Public?]; Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional
Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L.
REv. 62 (1990); Metzger, supra note 15; David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches
to Privatization: An Inquiry into the Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2000, at 83; Shapiro, supra note 16. See generally
Symposium, Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalization, supra note 16. Some of
these works, indeed, are extensive, highly abstract theoretical treatments, at least within
particular areas. This is true especially of the outstanding work on private standard setting
by Krislov and Schepel. See KRISLOV, supra note 6; SCHEPEL, supra note 6.
37. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 15, at 544-45; Chris Reeder, Regulation by
Contractors: Delegation of Legislative Power to Private Entities in Texas, 5 TEX. TECH. J.
TEX. ADMIN. L. 191 (2004).
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perceived changes in the state of things, which sometimes are said to have
produced "hybrid markets" or "hybrid public-private entities"-as pretty
much satisfactory.38
B. Preliminary Problems Throughout the Literature
Several basic weaknesses affect this body of writing. They are important
to this Article because they all in their own way contribute to the
literature's fundamental problem, which is its assumption of a meaningful
public-private divide. First, though it may seem to be a fairly superficial
weakness, most of the large body of recent writing neglects prior work on
non-state governance, going back at least to the 1920s.39 Again, a purpose
of this Article is to show the breadth of the issues raised by the very idea of
"privatization" as an important focus of concern. For whatever reason,
current literature has neglected much of the older material even though
38. For example, Jody Freeman's large and influential output has gone farther than
most in stressing that we must revise the way we currently see things-that we must
understand the mechanisms of "governance" to comprise both public and private players.
From that point on, however, her work seems to comprise mainly an optimistic defense of
the status quo, along with a curious affinity for taking the middle way in all matters of
doctrinal controversy that the status quo might pose. Her habit of presenting this as a matter
of seemingly neutral, practical policy conceals what is in effect quite a conservative
perspective. See, e.g., Freeman, New Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 819 ("How and
under what conditions we ought to constrain private actors depends ... on the advantages
they offer and the threats they pose .... "). Likewise, Alfred Aman believes the world to be
so radically different than commonly perceived that an essentially new administrative law is
required, which would be appropriate to the "complex nature of the hybrid markets that
privatized governmental services create." Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the
Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through
Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477, 1500 (2001) [hereinafter Aman,
Democracy Problem]. However, his work appears largely to argue that the primary policy
matter of concern is how to make modest procedural and open-government rules apply to
"hybrid" entities. See, e.g., id.; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the
Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 379 (2001).
39. See, e.g., JOHN J. CORSON, BUSINESS IN THE HUMANE SOCIETY (1971); CLARENCE H.
DANHOF, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1968); GUTTMAN
& WILLNER, supra note 25; JOHN D. HANRAHAN, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT (1983); DON
K. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE (1965); Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial
Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 451 (1920); Kurt L. Hanslowe, Regulation by Visible Public
and Invisible Private Government, 40 TEX. L. REV. 88 (1961); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making
by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937); Mark V. Nadel, The Hidden Dimension of
Public Policy: Private Governments and the Policy-Making Process, 37 J. POL. 2 (1975).
The United States government itself also has maintained a lively interest in these matters for
several decades. Notably, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (formerly the
General Accounting Office) has issued reams of widely read reports over a long period,
often quite cautionary in tone. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CIVIL SERVANTS
AND CONTRACT EMPLOYEES: WHO SHOULD Do WHAT FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT?
(1981). Likewise, the Office of Management and Budget during the Kennedy
Administration roundly criticized the influence of federal contractors in its influential "Bell
Report," so named for that office's director of the time. See BUREAU OF THE BUDGET,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING FOR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT (1962).
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much of it is directly relevant. Interestingly, some of that prior work was
to the effect that previous fetishes for privatization or making government
more "business-like" were so much snake oil.
40
Other weaknesses, moreover, seem more serious. To be fair, some of the
problems to be discussed here are matters of jurisprudential first
philosophy characteristic of much legal scholarship, in that the literature
adopts the traditional model of the law professor as an uninvited amicus
curiae. 4 1 They are nevertheless relevant because they help explain how the
literature has misconceived its own subject matter.
As a consequence of the amicus model much of the work remains
basically atheoretical, consisting mainly of extensive, more or less
journalistic reporting on the wide range of arrangements said to "privatize"
government functions. It often fails even to consider the plainest issues of
legal theory raised by these arrangements (like whether there is a
meaningful distinction between "public" and "private," or whether private
ordering can be said to be meaningfully different from "law"), and it is not
much given to social or political abstraction. Its main substantive
contribution typically is to suggest some doctrinal correction to some
existing legal rule that is relevant in some way, which assertedly will
address the relevant concerns.4 2 It assumes away the slim likelihood that
40. See, e.g., GUTTMAN & WILLNER, supra note 25; Charles T. Goodsell, Reinvent
Government or Rediscover It?, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 85 (1993) (reviewing DAVID
OSBOURNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992)); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing
Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative
Law, 57 U. Pir. L. REV. 405 (1996).
41. To call this a problem has itself been the subject of hot debate, and it is an artifact
of the unspecified means and ends of legal scholarship. Under these circumstances, it can
be hard even to say what seems wrong with an existing body of work, and it can seem unfair
to blame anyone for writing it in one way rather than another. I report with relief that I am
not the only one who thinks these things, and one need consult neither radicals nor skeptics
to find agreement on them. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1327, 1330 (2002) ("The legal profession has no shared vision of what kinds of
scholarship are most valuable or even most valued by the academy.... Any adequate
assessment of the state of legal scholarship needs some working definition of its mission.").
42. Frequent topics include how and whether nominally private entities should be made
subject to civil rights obligations. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 36; Kennedy, Private
Public?, supra note 36; Paul Howard Morris, Note, The Impact of Constitutional Liability
on the Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McNight, 52 VAND. L. REV. 489 (1999).
The non-delegation rule is another frequent topic. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 36; Metzger,
supra note 15. The amicus model also provides some judicially manageable distinction
between "public" and "private." See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 15, at 1388-89. Again, this
is not to say that contributions of legal theory have somehow been necessarily bad.
Metzger's and Krent's papers on the non-delegation rule, for example, both seem very
thoughtful and interesting. The problem is that they ask only those narrow questions of
doctrinal theory, and do not inquire any further into the rich field of social and
jurisprudential theory posed by "privatization." Admittedly, some doctrinal contributions
have been more expansive. Alfred Aman probably has gone farther than anyone, urging
disposal of "state-centered notion[s] of ... public law," in favor of a "non-state focused
approach to procedure" that would in effect "privatize the Administrative Procedure Act."
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this advice will be welcomed by its intended recipients, and for that
matter the complex and problematic question whether, even if courts were
to take any advice, changes in the rules they apply would have any effect
on larger social phenomena. Even the most general, theoretically informed
inquiries often merely offer practical advice to policymakers, 4  and
sometimes the work really suggests no solutions or theoretical observations
at all.45
Aman, Democracy Problem, supra note 38, at 1500. Aman so desires because "[w]here
powerful institutions control important aspects of individuals' lives, there should be a legal
commitment to a level of process necessary to assure transparency in the decision-making
process regardless of the label we place on the entities involved." Id. Much of his
background discussion is very interesting; in particular, his suggestion that "market
democracy" may be sufficient assurance of "transparency" in many private arrangements,
and his technical corrections to public contracting (which essentially would re-model
contracting-out decisions as something quite seperate from contracts) are very thoughtful
and commendable. But again, notice that although he does not say so explicitly, Aman's
argument in effect boils down entirely to a purportedly more appropriate determination of
whether a particular entity should be treated in the same way that government is treated, or
whether, under the circumstances, it should not be. For reasons of political expediency he
suggests this be done by a new federal statute modeled on the APA, rather than through case
law. His primary suggestion is merely a doctrinal tweak to the public-private distinction.
See id. at 1501.
43. The courts are unlikely to take direction on these matters from academic books and
law review articles. As to the public-private distinction, for example, their approach is one
of rigid and knee-jerking formality, and they have been using it for a long time with only
rare deviation. They do so notably in applying the "state action" rule in civil rights cases.
See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, Inc., 436
U.S. 149 (1978). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1698-1703 (2d ed. 1988) (describing contemporary state action case law as the search for a
distinction between "government" and "private" actors, and ultimately as the search for a
"rule subject to constitutional scrutiny [that can] be restated at the decisionmaking level at
which a government actor is responsible for its formulation"). Another notable area in
which the distinction is applied very rigidly is in antitrust immunity for political conduct.
See, e.g., Mass. School of Law at Andover v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding the American Bar Association (ABA) immune from antitrust liability for its
law school accreditation activities, on the theory that the "private" ABA had done no more
than submit its opinion of plaintiff law school to state governments). Courts sometimes
employ the distinction in areas like Establishment Clause cases. See, e.g., Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2001) (asking whether in-school religious conduct
violates the First Amendment by asking whether it was genuinely the conduct of the public
school defendants). Most obviously for present purposes the courts have applied the public-
private distinction in cases alleging unconstitutional delegations of regulatory power to
private parties. See Krent, supra note 36, at 69 n.17. The exception that proves the rule is
virtually an orphan in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and is more than fifty years old.
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The courts are abetted in this rigidity by the
advice of many legal thinkers that the autonomy and "private" status of non-government
associations is important to protecting individual liberty and constraining government
abuses. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments,
78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 144 (2003); Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly:
Rethinking the Value ofAssociations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 949 (2004).
44. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 21 (offering transaction cost-based guidance as to
which "public" functions can safely be contracted out and which should be retained in
government control); Aman, Democracy Problem, supra note 38 (urging a revised
conception of administrative law designed to cope with "hybrid" public-private governance
entities).
45. For example, Professor Minow argues that healthy apportionment of public and
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Yet more serious are certain philosophical precommitments generally
shared in this literature. First, the literature states or implies a strong
presumption of relatively stable definitional boundaries, and thus shares a
metaphysical realism about legal institutions. Law deploys generalizations
whose extensionality is thought to be meaningful and metaphysically
"real"-in short, law is distinctions-and the privatization literature takes
for granted that the distinctions are not subject to radical deficiencies of
epistemology or metaphysics. Thus, it is presumed, things are different, in
ways we can identify with confidence, and important policy consequences
can be made to depend on the differences. Accordingly, the literature
remains uncritically hung up on purely formal, conceptual distinctions
between juridical entities, which assertedly exist and are assertedly distinct
from one another.
Second, the literature systematically exaggerates (or at least leaves
unexamined) the significance of legal doctrine itself. The over-emphasis
seems based neither on any practical evidence nor on any serious
theoretical examination, but rather it reflects a shared socialization among
law school graduates. By our traditional approach to questions of policy, in
which all lawyers are trained, we assume that law in application necessarily
bears a close relationship to the social phenomena it purports to regulate.
We should recall that we are also mostly socialized to identify law in the
manner of the Holmesian "bad man"-that is, we perceive legal doctrine as
a prediction of the future behavior of the particular appendage of
government that is the courts.46 Accordingly, our basic approach to policy
is to assume that the behavior of the courts correlates closely with the
social phenomena in question, but that assumption is rash.47 Its relevance
private roles can only be reached through public debate, performed according to a list of the
proper values, which she specifies. This is essentially her only proposal. See MINOW, supra
note 17, at 45-46.
46. See 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459, 461 (1897)
("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man ....
[Under that perspective, the 'law' is] [t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious .. "). Because Holmes' "bad man" has been the subject of much
discussion, see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B. U. L. REv. 773,
773 n.2 (1998) (collecting and discussing perspectives and critiques), let me be clear that
what I mean by the "bad man" model is that law is nothing more than a prediction of the
future behavior of a particular institution.
47. The character of the relationship is an empirical question, and indeed, a body of
modem jurisprudence indicates that there is no strong relationship. Famously both law and
economics and critical legal studies are said to share with a common predecessor, legal
realism, a skepticism about the real significance of legal doctrine. In particular the Coase-
ean tradition in law and economics and also much of the private ordering literature are to the
effect that legal rules are often secondary at best to results actually observed in practice.
Moreover, while the question remains one of untested empiricism, the astonishing
infrequency of actual litigation in contemporary America must attenuate this relation even
further. Cf Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 459 (2004) (documenting
the decline in the number of cases that are resolved in court).
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to this Article is that legally formal delegations to "private" entities and the
issues of administrative and constitutional law they seem to raise seem
significant only because the range of quite formal, bureaucratized social
management functions already long in the hands of "private" entities-
which dwarfs those recently "privatized"-is invisible if one looks for
policy problems only in the positive "law." Thus, what makes more sense
as a broad sociological analysis of institutions has remained narrowed in
focus on the particular behavior of American bureaucrats over just the past
several years.
Perhaps a resulting problem is that much of the privatization literature
seems to have a poor grasp of its own historical background. As suggested
at several points already, the legally formalistic definition of
"privatization" normally excludes a significant range of social phenomena
that are not substantively distinct from the government relationships under
review. It also causes most writers to take for granted that "privatization"
has become much more frequent in just the past several years.48 Even the
most thorough analyses, even when they acknowledge prior instances of
conscious government delegation, typically claim that "privatization" as it
now exists really began sometime around the advent of Thatcherism and
was transported here only during the Reagan Administration.49
This raises several problems. First, even on the narrow definition of
"privatization," it is false. Instances of privatization in the United States
are not only old,50 but have occurred in profusion for a long time.5"
48. Incidentally, with a disappointing predictability, the literature often explicitly or
implicitly associates this "new" privatization with the "new" economy of the internet,
globalized commerce, mass communications, and so on, with the underlying claim often
being that privatization is a natural or at least inevitable thing, because traditional
government neither can nor should perform all the complex social ordering that is now
required. A certain cautionary history surrounds this sort of thing. See, e.g., CHARLES P.
KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES (4th ed. 2000); CHARLES MACKAY,
EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (1841). Probably
"privatization" authors should be more careful about leaping from the apparent affinity with
high technology to the conclusion of novelty, especially in light of the recent cottage
industry in professional critique of New Economy eschatology. See, e.g., JEAN GADREY,
NEW ECONOMY, NEW MYTH 3 (2003); Robert J. Gordon, Does the "New Economy"
Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (2000) (downplaying
the relative importance of recent technological advances).
49. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 4-6.
50. See HANRAHAN, supra note 39, at 79-80 (discussing military contracting at the time
of the Revolutionary War); DONALD F. KETTL, SHARING POWER: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND
PRIVATE MARKETS 6-7 (discussing the early growth of United States contracting practices).
51. See Guttman, Governance by Contract, supra note 36, at 322-23 & n.1. Even if it
made sense to focus only on formal, conscious acts of government delegation, the existing
literature's account of it is not very good, for that kind of "contracting out" was hugely
employed by the federal government for four decades prior to the Reagan Administration.
The United States military began a tradition of reliance on nominally private research
entities and "management" consultants starting at about the time of World War II. This
tradition expanded quite dramatically throughout the Great Society years, and resulted in the
expenditure of billions of dollars, throughout the 1960s, through an agency within the
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Elsewhere, private service of nominally public ends has occurred
extensively and for many centuries. The narrow account is also
misleading to the extent it suggests that United States governments once
managed some much larger range of social functions than they now do. On
the contrary, Americans have long left much more to the private sector than
other Western nations,53 and prior to the 1960s American governments
regulated much less of society than is now commonly perceived.54
It appears that a key piece of the evidence for "newness," whether
explicitly acknowledged or not, has been that politicians talk about
privatization, claim they have accomplished it, and congratulate themselves
for it a lot. But political rhetoric must be among the most misleading
hearsay, and in this particular case it has been very bad evidence of reality.
For one thing, prevailing rhetoric has caused privatizing to be commonly
thought of as a conservative policy, but that is not the case.55 Also quite
Department of Health, Education and Welfare called the Office of Economic Opportunity.
See GUTTMAN & WILLNER, supra note 25.
52. A large body of literature shows how many pre nation-state princes relied upon
nominally private entities for undertakings large and small. See Guttman, Governance by
Contract, supra note 36, at 322 n.1; Franklin G. Snyder, Sharing Sovereignty: Non-State
Associations and the Limits of State Power, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 365 (2004).
53. Americans regularly carry out an unusual range of important social functions
through nominally non-state associations. Tocqueville famously observed that:
Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever
forming associations . . . [They are] of a thousand different types-religious,
moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very
minute.... In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, where in France you
would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United
States you are sure to find an association.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Doubleday Anchor Books 1969) (1839). Indeed a number of these privately
organized functions render the United States virtually unique in the industrialized world.
For example, the United States is the only industrialized nation other than South Africa to
retain a wholly private system of health care, resulting in very high administrative costs that
consume a significant slice of the nation's entire gross domestic product. The attempt to
socialize some healthcare functions has been among the most intensely fought political
battles of the twentieth century. See generally DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE,
CRITICAL CONDITION: How HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA BECAME BIG BUSINESS-AND BAD
MEDICINE (2004). Likewise, major functions of U.S. monetary policy remain in the hands
of nominally private entities, not necessarily because it was better to do it that way, but
because political compromise was needed to create the Federal Reserve. The Reserve's
powerful Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) directs the government's efforts to
control the money supply through purchase and sale of its own securities. Krent, supra note
36, at 85. The private members of the FOMC are elected by the boards of directors of the
Federal Reserve Banks, which are themselves nominally private; though the Executive
Branch has some hand in peopling the Federal Reserve system, it has no direct involvement
in the appointment or removal of the FOMC's private members. Id. at 84-85 & n.66.
54. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986) (detailing the rise of the formal regulatory state in the United
States in the twentieth century).
55. The much ballyhooed Clinton-Gore "Reinventing Government" initiative had much
in common with both the current president's agenda and with proposals of the Reagan
Commission on Privatization. See BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE REAGAN-BUSH
ERA: THE ERUPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE 176-77 (1995) (noting the similarity of
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misleading can be politicians' self-congratulation and their recriminations.
For example, despite the fanfare of its promises and the fears it engendered,
the Reagan Administration's privatization agenda was much less successful
than is commonly thought,56 and the Clinton Administration failed to
acknowledge that much of the downsizing for which it took credit was an
inevitable side-effect of the "peace dividend" that followed the end of the
Cold War.57  Finally, one might remember the general predilection of
politicians for faddish policy trends-what Jerry Mashaw calls "the
management fraternities' panaceas du jour.' '58 Those fads often are most
remarkable for the speed with which they are first idolatrized and then
forgotten, and the recent fetish for "privatization" is driven by them. Their
lack of rigor degrades the reliability of the politicians' talk that they inform.
So is there anything actually new, or at least unique, about
"privatization" as the literature has defined it? Surely it is real in some
sense. Tax revenues can be expended through various channels that differ
from one another institutionally, and presumably those different payment
streams produce outcomes that differ from one another in various
qualities. 59 Also, it is "important" in some sense, in that on a superficial
political level it makes sense for voters to care about how some particular
public service is provided. Likewise, it seems that while politicians
frequently exaggerate their own privatizing efforts, political actors do in
fact sometimes modify the personnel and streams of payments by which
Clinton's regulatory agenda to his predecessors', including their privatization efforts);
Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of
Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 861
(2000) [hereinafter Guttman, Public Purpose] (noting that the various means offered by the
Clinton-Gore initiative had long been in use by the federal government). Likewise, Jimmy
Carter's antigovernment theme of the mid-1970s may have been less strident than Ronald
Reagan's, but it was nevertheless central to his electoral success. See DONAHUE, supra note
21, at 3.
56. See generally COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CIVIL SERVANTS
AND CONTRACT EMPLOYEES: WHO SHOULD Do WHAT FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? 26-
28 (1981) (complaining that outsourcing efforts between 1955 and 1981 had been largely
ineffective); KETTL, supra note 50, at 47-51. As Kettl notes, by far the bulk of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 cost comparisons actually carried out during
the Reagan Administration occurred within the Department of Defense (DOD), which along
with three other agencies accounted for 96% of all of the alleged "savings." See id. at 49.
All federal agencies other than DOD, the General Services Administration, and the
Departments of Transportation and Commerce-either performed very few A-76 cost
comparisons or ignored the directive entirely. See id. at 48.
57. See Paul C. Light, Outsourcing and the True Size of Government, 33 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 311,312-13 (2004).
58. Mashaw, supra note 40, at 408.
59. Notable examples include the varying incentives of actors within those channels
and the consequences of the resulting differences in agency costs and productive
efficiencies. See DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 79-98, 215-23.
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government treasury expenditures lead to policy outcomes. It may even be
that instances of this behavior have become statistically more frequent, and
certainly they are more talked about than they once were.
But does that mean anything has really changed? Is this evidence that
the world is changing, or just its decor?
In any case, as one final problem, the literature's formalistic definition of
its own topic and the resulting failure to appreciate the larger picture has
kept it isolated from other schools of thought to which it has obvious
theoretical affinities. For example, privatization authors seem uninterested
in the recent vein on the governmental role of non-state voluntary
associations 60 or the historical literature on American associationalism
generally. 61  Likewise they have neglected the older but still-thriving
tradition that concerns "private ordering,, 62 the critique of private property
60. In the legal literature, most of this work is to the effect that private groups, like
families, social clubs, and churches, perform a function of such purely social significance in
society that they should be understood as essentially governmental or sovereign. Its thrust is
that these groups are fundamental to individual freedom and actualization and therefore
deserve special legal status. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 43 (arguing that such organizations
should have the right to govern their own members); Snyder, supra note 52, at 399; Vischer,
supra note 43. Interestingly, neither the American "privatization" work nor the "voluntary
associations" work in the law reviews appears to be aware of the strong relevance of the
political theory of Jiurgen Habermas, and the general significance of private associations in
European thought. At least one work, however, has given the matter extensive thought. See
SCHEPEL, supra note 6, at 11-21.
61. A large literature recounts the rise and influence of private associations in American
history, meaning in particular trade and professional associations. See, e.g., ELLIS W.
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 1-71 (1966) (chronicling the rise
of business associationalism at the turn of the twentieth century, which culminated in the
National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933); ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND THE TRADE
ASSOCIATION ISSUE, 1921-1933 (2d ed. 1993); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 84-88 (1956)
(noting the dramatic increase in the formation and activities of private political and trade
associations beginning in the 1860s, and arguing that the trend reflected growing concern
over concentration of capital and political power in private hands; as Hurst says, "[t]heir
development reflected pervasive unease and dissatisfaction with emerging patterns of power
and the lack of defined policy toward emerging issues"); BRADFORD SMITH, A DANGEROUS
FREEDOM (1963) (chronicling the history of American associationalism and the
constitutional right of assembly); Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce
Secretariat, and the Vision of an "Associative State," 1921-1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 116
(1974).
62. Work on "private ordering" is diverse. It has its roots in part in Coase, as much of it
concerns the arrangements people make with one another in the absence or in spite of law,
see, for example, ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991), but also reflects legal realist concern for the power of private influence.
See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering
Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (1998). Interest in these
matters remains lively. See, e.g., Avitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L.
REV. 1179; Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the
Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (1997);
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and contract of the legal realists, 63 and the even older critique of public-
private dichotomies on which the realists appear to have drawn.
64
II. DECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
Again, each of these preliminary problems, in their own way, contributes
to a deeper problem-the assumption that there is a meaningful difference
between the government bureaucracies from which functions are
"privatized" and the private delegates that receive them. In other words,
the very idea that there is "privatization" or that it is importantly different
from other institutional arrangements implies a commitment to some fairly
strong public-private distinction.65
Public-private dichotomies are very old, and the idea that there is some
meaningful and administrable difference between public and private affairs,
as a jurisprudential proposition, is central to liberal political philosophy.66
They are also omnipresent and come in a variety of guises-we perceive
separate public and private spheres relating to our personal and family
lives, sexual morality, spiritual and civic affairs, economic activity, and no
doubt many other areas. But as mentioned above, the two respects in
which it is important to address the distinction here are in its role as a
conceptual jurisprudential proposition and in its role as an economic
argument-in which it assumes that markets are importantly different from
government bureaucracies.
Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory
of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 319 (2002); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2002); Barak D.
Richman, Community Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in
New York (Harvard John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 384, 2002), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin center/papers/pdf/384.pdf. An interestingly
similar perspective is discussed in Neel P. Parekh, When Nice Guys Finish First: The
Evolution of Cooperation, the Study of Law, and the Ordering of Legal Regimes, 37 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 909 (2004).
63. Examined at length in BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-
FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (2001). The realist
critique seems germane because the very idea of a donation of functions by "government" to
"private" entities poses a public-private distinction of which several realists spent whole
careers dissecting.
64. See, for example, Neil Duxbury's work on Rodolf von Jhering and Jhering's
possible influence on the realists. Neil Duxbury, Jhering's Philosophy of Authority, 27 Ox.
J. LEG. STUDIES (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ojls.oxfordjoumals.org or http://
www.law.manchester.ac.uk/aboutus/staff/neil-duxbury/default.htm (discussing Jhering's
critique of the public-private distinction and the affinity of his views with those of various
realists).
65. A related discussion, which develops some of these same issues in more detail and
raises others not discussed here, appears in Chris Sagers, Monism, Nominalism and Public-
Private in the Work of Margaret Jane Radin, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219, 225-30, 240-47
(2006).
66. See generally id. at 225-30 (discussing the history and political significance of the
public-private distinction).
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A. The Public-Private Distinction as a Proposition of Sociology or
Positive Law
An obvious challenge for scholarship in this area is that the line-drawing
problem of the public-private distinction must be addressed by some
doctrinal means by any proposed policy correction to privatization
problems. More sophisticated scholarly efforts normally acknowledge the
distinction's difficulty,67 as its use in the courts has been among the most
criticized doctrinal issues in modem times.68 However, in privatization and
elsewhere, legal academics frequently go on to assert that it nevertheless
can be handled through some second-best or heuristic alternative.69 Some
of these efforts seem surprisingly formal and uncritical, 70 and even more
67. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 17, at 29 (the distinction is "notoriously complex");
Metzger, supra note 15, at 1400 ("Line-drawing [in this connection] is... very difficult.");
Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C.
L. REv. 397, 402-21 (2006) (discussing the distinction in history and theory).
68. Charles Black famously described the Supreme Court's "state action" jurisprudence
as "a conceptual disaster area" that "has the flavor of a torchless search for a way out of a
damp echoing cave," Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreward:
"State Action, " Equal Protection, and California 's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95
(1967), and even the doctrine's defenders believe that in application in the lower federal
courts it has been something of a disaster. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the
Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action
Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302, 321-34 (1995) (arguing that problems in the doctrine
stem not from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, but from formalistic application by lower
courts of talismanic slogans rather than pragmatic case-by-case applications intended by the
Supreme Court). For further discussion, including elaboration on the many, routine, daily
situations in which the distinction proves grossly inadequate, see Sagers, supra note 65, at
242-47.
69. See, e.g., Aman, Democracy Problem, supra note 38, at 1491 (noting that Aman
"[r]efus[es] to treat the public/private distinction as an either/or discourse... [because] ...
[b]right lines between markets and regulation.., are.., neither necessary nor desirable");
Margaret Jane Radin, Machine Rule: The Latest Challenge to Law 2 (Jan. 31, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
I am a pragmatist about the public/private distinction, meaning that in my view it is
not a conceptual or formal distinction, an either/or that is easy to deconstruct, but
rather a contextual characterization that tends to work in practice most of the time.
Most of the time, that is, what is public and what is private has been capable of
being sorted out in a way that is functionally understood, in spite of the difficult
borderline cases.
Id.; cf RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 84-85, 198 (1989)
(identifying the public-private split as a well-established "practical measure" to "distinguish
public from private questions" and thereby to protect private institutions important to
personal life); Frank Michelman, Private Personal But Not Split: Radin versus Rorty, 63 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1783, 1783-84 (1990) (discussing Rorty's position). A fairly common insight
is that, while the distinction has no judicially administrable legal meaning, it remains
meaningful in understanding governance, and as a concept in political debate and
decisionmaking. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 17, at 22-32. Occasionally, for various
reasons, an author will urge that the distinction does not matter. See, e.g., Steven L.
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 319, 324 n.25 (2002) (arguing that because
his paper dealing with the legitimacy of "commercial private ordering" considers only
public perceptions of legitimacy and not the actual location of regulatory power, he need not
engage the distinction itself).
70. For example, Professor Freeman, who has produced an otherwise thoughtful and
voluminous body of work, committed one of the most telling slips in this entire literature.
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thorough efforts can be unsatisfying,7' though often they can be quite
subtle.72 They are all understandable; one sometimes senses that these
authors, consciously or unconsciously, are really struggling to avoid
confrontation of a Marxist instinct, which under current circumstances
would be quite unfashionable.
While she evidently distrusts legal formalisms and any bright lines between government and
private sectors, she decries arguments either that "there is no such thing as 'public' and
'private' or that "there is no such thing as an agency." She then adds that: "There is clearly
such a thing as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or the Internal Revenue Service. You can visit their headquarters in
Washington." Freeman, supra note 15, at 572 (emphasis added). Surely the fact that a
particular brick-and-mortar building exists in a particular city is the most unimportant of
sociological facts, so long as the question is the existence of some organization of human
individuals and the delimitability of its "boundaries." Those phenomena seem to have little
to do with any tangible object-if indeed they are real phenomena to begin with. Perhaps
Professor Freeman meant this only as a shorthand way of implying that we can make use of
our instincts heuristically, despite penumbral uncertainty, because of the obviousness of
core cases. But the existence of an institution and its attributes are not made "clear" even by
thorough, case-specific analysis of directionalities of power, flows of money, information
and resources, allegiance to constituencies, or any number of non-legal norms-analysis of
a sort largely absent from this literature.
71. For example, as mentioned above, see supra note 45, Professor Minow has
suggested that public and private concepts have to be retained, and she thinks that
appropriate lines between them can be set, apparently without much difficulty, but only
through a process of public debate and not through legislation or adjudication. She says that
debate can find workable solutions so long as it considers a list of appropriate values, which
she supplies. She takes this view because, like most other thoughtful thinkers on the matter,
she acknowledges the difficulty of the public-private distinction, and thinks its problems
would make it too hard to come up with a priori doctrinal solutions to public-private
partnership problems. "The lines themselves are historical inventions," she says, each being
merely "a fiction, a convention of speech." MINOW, supra note 17, at 22, 29. Tellingly,
however, and even aside from the radical problem of moral epistemology behind her list of
appropriate values (how does she know they are the right ones?), her list contains such an
evenly balanced collection of opposing ideals as to be thoroughly indeterminate. See id. at
45-46. Moreover, even having admitted its difficulties, she proceeds as if the "line" is
meaningful and administrable, and can be a part of purely rational public exchange. For
example, she takes as a chief purpose to show that there have been "crossing[s] [of]
boundaries," a phrase she uses at least once every few pages, and ultimately she asserts that
"the underlying concerns that the[] words ['public' and 'private'] signal should guide debate
and decision." Id. at 33. Accordingly, she is comfortable, despite the distinction's
"notorious[] complex[ity]," announcing that religious hospitals should not be considered
"public" even when they are dominant in a community and predominantly federally funded.
Id. at 29, 35. Her reasons consist only of her view that "[p]reserving their status as private
entities is vital to promote freedom" and "[t]he simple receipt of public dollars does not
convert a private entity into a public one." Id. at 35. To this extent, having acknowledged
doctrinal indeterminacy and having tried to patch it with public debate, Professor Minow is
left with a moral relativism characteristic of all apologetic defenses of democracy-and one
inconsistent with the moral undercurrent running throughout her work and most of the
privatization literature. Winding up in that position also betrays the public-private
distinction's lack of any moral or sociological content.
72. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 15, at 1462-63 (suggesting a "private delegation"
doctrine to judge the constitutionality of privatizations, as a means of properly
differentiating exercises of governmental from non-governmental power; Metzger's test
essentially depends on agency concepts, insofar as it asks whether the private deputy acts on
"behalf' of government); Radin, supra note 69; see also Verknil, supra note 67, at 402-21
(extensively discussing the history and current content of the distinction).
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However, I believe that, even for their apparent reasonableness, these
approaches are all quite wrong, and that it is useful to move a step
beyond.73 Indeed, with a little thought, one of the commonly made claims
in the "privatization" literature can seem bizarrely false. It is not so that
most cases posed under the distinction are obvious "core cases," and that,
except in rare cases at the periphery, the distinction can be easily employed
on some commonsense basis. On the contrary, though its failings are often
hard to see (because belief in the distinction is so firmly embedded), they
are omnipresent. In particular, as a proposition of legal doctrine the
distinction frequently calls for different legal treatment of entities that are
substantially similar. By generally rendering the laws that impose public-
regarding obligations inapplicable to "private" entities, the distinction
creates what may be a very large sphere of social action-in which major
allocations of social goods are made-that is freed from our basic
frameworks designed to ensure that those allocations are made in the
common interest.
The critique can be stated more formally. In one standard version, the
analysis begins with the Hohfeldian view that every "right" necessarily
limits countervailing freedoms.74 Because "rights" in our system are
themselves laws given by our government, backed by official coercion, the
seemingly private exercise of any such right in fact entails the exercise of
public power.75 Therefore, no difference seems left between public and
private action that will robustly resist counterexamples.
76
73. To be clear, this Article does not aspire to doctrinal critique as such, and prescribes
no doctrinal medicine. However, careful analysis of this one point of doctrine is useful to
the larger conceptions of governance institutions discussed here and to why existing talk
about "privatization" seems misdirected.
74. Wesley Hohfeld long ago observed that "rights" necessarily imply limits on
countervailing freedoms. But as later theorists observed, this insight could prove to be quite
subversive to traditional liberal accounts of our legal order. See FRIED, supra note 63, at
51-55 (discussing the logical end-point of the Hohfeld-inspired Progressive critique of
"rights"); Sagers, supra note 65, at 236 n.62 (discussing this insight and Fried's
interpretation of it).
75. Progressives in the early twentieth century were quick to seize on these implications
of Hohfeld's work, particularly in their attack on liberty-of-contract case law (though
Hohfeld may neither have agreed nor anticipated their view). As Barbara Fried notes,
Hohfeld's views were recognized immediately by Progressives for their "seditious
implications." See FRIED, supra note 65, at 53, 103-04.
76. One obvious difference might seem to be that an individual and a government
official are differently incentivized, insofar as the individual's exercise of rights are
necessarily personal. But are they really so different? While having no fealty personally to
public choice doctrine, I would suggest that one undeniably appealing insight is its
observation that government agents necessarily serve their own interests at least some of the
time, and at least sometimes service of those interests is amplified through the agent's
discretionary exercise of official power. Metzger's view that a "private" actor becomes in
some sense "public" when it acts as government's "agent," see supra note 15, is not actually
apt because it is not so much a defense of the distinction as it is a means of employing a
distinction that is already presumed to exist and to be usable. After all, should she really be
understood to argue that there is an important and robustly defensible difference between a
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The distinction remains ubiquitous, however, and it will be useful to
examine the several defenses made of it. First, the purely formal,
institutional positivism often driving it is quite weak. For example,
imagine that a standard-setting body composed of representatives of an
industry promulgates a model standard for the design of their products, and
then state and local governments adopt that standard as law through an
unreflective rubber-stamp.77 In no meaningful way did any body of
traditional government formulate the underlying policy, even though in
some superficial sense it would be easy to say so, and even though the
public-private distinction would cause most lawyers to think it. 78
Recognizing the misleading character of this sort of formalism, most legal
thinkers prefer the more nuanced distinction that, unlike private actions, the
state's pronouncements are backed by legitimate coercion and, in
particular, that the state may employ ultimate forms of violent coercion.79
While maybe more intuitively appealing, this too turns out to seem quite
weak. A wide array of nominally private associations can impose fines,
expulsion, and other sanctions 80 and to insist that the coercion open to state
actors is importantly different from these sorts of penalties would be to
insist that, say, a civil antitrust enforcement action is not "law" because it is
not enforceable by death. Very similarly, it is not useful to distinguish
"government agent" and the "agent" of a corporation that is itself an "agent" of the
government?
77. This happens with astonishing frequency. See Sagers, Case Study, supra note 6, at
1398-1400 & n.15.
78. That this approach is weak has hardly prevented the courts from adopting it. See
Mass. School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1027 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding the ABA immune for law school accreditation activities, finding them to be
merely appeals to government to deny bar admission to graduates of non-accredited law
schools); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that although defendant psychiatric certification board's decisions were the
basis of granting certain state benefits, the board was not a "state actor"); Sessions Tank
Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 17 F.3d 295, 299-300 (9th Cir. 1994) (immunizing deliberate
misrepresentations to a standard setting organization as valid attempts to influence
government action); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1383 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding the ABA immune for promulgation of model ethical rules); Sherman College of
Straight Chiropractic v. Am. Chiropractic Ass'n, Inc., 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding a chiropractic trade association immune for school accreditation activities);
Zavaletta v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding the ABA immune).
79. Weber stated this argument explicitly in 1918. See MAX WEBER, Politics as a
Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77-78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright
Mills, trans. 1958) ("Ultimately one can define the modem state sociologically only in terms
of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of
physical force.... [A] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly
of the legitimate use of physical force."). Arguably it appears in slightly different form in
Austin's "command" theory of law in the early nineteenth century. See 1 JOHN AUSTIN,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 178 (London, John Murry 1830) ("Laws properly so called are
a species of commands.").
80. Obvious examples include religious excommunication, expulsion from a trade
group for violation of membership or conduct rules, denial of licensure or certification, or
money penalties.
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subjection to state versus non-state authority based on its "voluntariness."
At least in our society, subjection to many forms of state authority is
voluntary to some meaningful extent, and subjection to many forms of non-
state authority is only "voluntary" in the same formal sense as was implied
in the liberty of contract case law.8'
A subtler approach might be to say that only those acts publicly
perceived to be "legitimate" acts of government should be considered
"public." Legitimacy might be an important element of government power
in that it enables the authorities to rule with minimal coercion.8 2 The
problem is that allegedly "private" entities hold influence that is popularly
legitimized in ways not meaningfully distinct from the legitimization of
government. For example, Americans do not commonly question the
coercive power of organized business entities over their employees. No
one would seriously doubt that such power exists, and most would not
doubt its legitimacy.83
Indeed, the most important critique of the distinction may be one that is
brought into sharp relief by the subject of this Article. Though it is not
often stated, a difference presumed to exist between the "public" and
"private" is that, in the former, allocations of social values can be made in a
generalized manner; whereas, in the latter, they are conceptualized as only
the aggregate of individual transactions-namely, as (often somewhat
mystically) idealized transactions of "market exchange." But this is also
incorrect. Among the range of non-state entities making important
allocations in American society, there are literally thousands-including
standard setters, product design consortia, large corporations, voluntary
professional associations, and so on-that are capable of making large
81. See Sagers, supra note 65, at 243-44 & n.93; see also Snyder, supra note 52, at 378
(providing a persuasive argument on this point along with several illustrations).
82. Cf DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 352-62 (1965); Nadel,
supra note 39, at 18-19 (discussing this aspect of Easton's definition of "public" policy).
Strictly speaking, this actually differs from Easton's definition of the subject matter of
political science-the "authoritative allocation of values for a society .... He says an
allocation can be "authoritative" so long as it is likely to be accepted within a society, even
it if is perceived to be illegitimate. See Easton, supra note 9, at 286-87.
83. The "legitimacy" here is driven by the logic of property. The proprietor may hire,
fire, discipline, impose institutionalized norms, and socialize workplace behaviors
(including whole attitudes, moralities, and personalities) because the proprietor owns the
productive assets at issue and its revenues. By characterizing the coercive potential of
property as simply a private right of ownership, the common view renders the employee's
subjection voluntary and therefore, in the popular perspective, fair. Thus, property and
"privateness" are themselves agents to legitimize otherwise contingent and debatable
allocations of coercive influence. See Sagers, supra note 65, at 245-46 & n.100 (developing
this argument and relating it to the larger concept of "power" generally).
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allocations by generalized fiat. The effectiveness of these gestures does not
depend on whether the acting entity is a "public" one, but only on whether
it has power of some nature over some class of persons. 4
Ultimately, the public-private distinction, like many other rules of law, is
merely a normative commitment that happens to appear as an identification
of pre-existing nature. Common defenses of this distinction do not explain
its durability. In fact, the only clear explanation, and the only sense in
which the distinction even approaches some meaningfully real
metaphysical status rather than that of raw, normative politics, is from the
view of the Holmesian bad man. The distinction has content neither as a
proposition of morality nor as a description of sociological reality, but it
does to some extent explain how courts decide cases. Courts are
institutionally constrained to enforce binding government statements, but
not, for instance, pronouncements of the president of General Motors. But
the distinction is hollow and uninteresting as a description of anything
except for what the courts will do. As Mark Nadel says, "[w]hen we say
that a member of the school board in Sheboygan, Wisconsin, is part of 'the
authorities' but the president of General Motors is not, we cannot go very
far in understanding political behavior or public policy.
86
What remains might be the explanation behind this explanation-that is,
the reason that such a seemingly feeble, clumsy and arguably harmful little
doctrinal trick could enjoy such tenacious longevity. The apparent answer
is not theorizable or systematic, and seems at least in part political. To
some extent the distinction appears convenient to preserve a particular
normative conception of the arrangement of society-that is, it is literally
conservative. Moreover, it is easy to overlook the distinction's significance
in setting the terms and limits of our political consciousness. While one
surely can find strong statements of its value to liberal society,87 there is
perhaps less conscious awareness these days of its role in justifying the
going order of things, and rendering fundamental criticisms of that order
implausible, despite what otherwise might seem to be its ugliness. Indeed,
though we give it little thought, whether the distinction has some
84. For example, as even the Supreme Court has recognized, standard setting groups
can have real power not only when their standards are adopted by actual governments, but
also when standards are merely of their own independent effect. See Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 498 n.2 (1988).
85. Though, indeed, the distinction is problematic even as a bad-man prediction.
Courts frequently give (often outcome-determinative) weight to the government-like acts of
nominally "private" entities. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental
Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health,
56 TEX. L. REv. 1329 (1978) (noting the influence of privately set safety and design
standards in tort litigation); Sagers, supra note 65, at 244 & nn.94-95.
86. Nadel, supra note 39, at 19.
87. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 67, at 405 ("[T]he [public-private] line is
fundamental-it ultimately distinguishes liberal society from its despotic alternatives.").
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meaningful reality goes to the very moral legitimacy of the liberal capitalist
order. To the extent that the legitimating function in this respect is to
disguise unequal distributions of power, this is again a Hohfeldian insight
and one familiar from the work of some realists and critical legal theorists.
Though legal discourse largely denies it, formal "rights" and "duties" are in
practice vessels to be filled with the substance of prior endowments-
endowments of skill, social position, wealth, or other phenomena that give
substantive value (or lack thereof) to their holders.
Importantly, however, defense of the distinction is not ideologically
specific; indeed, critics and proponents of "privatization" both require the
distinction as basic to their positions. Despite its weaknesses and the
instinct of many to attack it in certain circumstances, there is no across-the-
board political will to dispense with it. 89 Advocates on both left and right
make use of the distinction in different contexts, and its invocation appears
to be mainly a matter of political convenience.
B. Markets as Institutional Alternative to Government:
The Public-Private Distinction as an Economic Argument
A second major theoretical critique is required. It is very commonly
assumed that our two basic choices for organization of society are
government bureaucracy and markets.90 Thus, it is commonly taken for
88. In this vein Professor Fried recalls a delicious observation of Anatole France: "The
law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges ... 
FRIED, supra note 63, at 42.
89. See Sagers, supra note 65, at 230 (discussing the distinction's appeal across the
political spectrum).
90. This is often said by social scientists. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS
AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977); Douglass C. North, A
Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355, 361 (1990) ("[T]he basic
separation between polity and economy has always, even amongst the most confirmed
libertarians, left a residual of activities to be undertaken by government."); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract,
16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 174-75 (2002) (discussing comparative advantages of ordering by
markets and government bureaucracy). Law professors do this as well. See, e.g., Einer
Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1195-98
(1992) (arguing that the rules making up the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine in
antitrust law serve to ensure that resource allocations will be made either by democractically
accountable actors or by markets kept healthy through antitrust); Einer Elhauge, The Scope
ofAntitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 668, 696-97 (1991) (arguing that the same rationale
explains the so-called "state action immunity" in antitrust). The distinction is more or less
basic in rhetoric surrounding "deregulation." See Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating
'Deregulation' of Commercial Air Travel: False Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and
Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 115-16 (1989) (criticizing facile
use of the distinction). It has surfaced in interesting ways in judicial opinions. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1996) (refusing to grant a private prison
guard defendant in a § 1983 action the same immunity as would be enjoyed by traditional
government prison employees, and basing the distinction on the "market" influences that
govern private prisons but do not govern public ones). Indeed, this basic distinction and the
mutual exclusivity of the two options is sometimes taken for granted even by sharp critics of
neoclassical orthodoxy. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Organizations and Markets, 5 J. ECON.
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granted in the privatization literature that when government cedes a
function to the private sector, market forces will regulate it.91 This plays a
very important role in rhetoric and research on privatization because it is
taken for granted that a systematic and fundamental difference between the
two spheres is that actors within them are differently incentivized.
However, though it may sound surprising to some, investigation remains
highly incomplete of the aggregate of self-serving, essentially pecuniary
instincts that, if left unfettered, are believed to orchestrate much of
society's workings. The actual prevalence of such markets and the impact
that other social institutions may have on them are questions of empirical
sociology that remain almost completely unanswered.
It is worth observing first that the critique here need make no recourse to
the well-known and contested sub-genre that critiques law and economics
and price theory generally. 92 We may assume that price theory remains
fully wholesome and above reproach in its own sphere-as a deliberately
abstracted description of genuinely individuated transactions, incentivized
by personal human desires, and constrained by competitive demand for
scarce resources. The claim here is that price theory has little or nothing to
say about at least some certain classes of social ordering decisions, and that
PERSP. 25 (1991); cf Herbert Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 1, 6-7 (1978) (asserting that individuals make decisions based more on
qualitative analysis of "discrete structural alternatives" than on quantitative analysis of
equilibrium at the margins).
91. See, e.g., Aman, Democracy Problem, supra note 38, at 1488-91.
92. Critique of the movement is hardly new, but there has recently emerged something
of a small cottage industry in it. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A
NEW ECONOMICS 1-87 (1988) (attacking the commitment of neoclassicism to individual
utility maximization); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM (1997); Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to
Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303 (2005); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life
Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of Non-
Falsfiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1991); Reza Dibadj,
Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for "Critical Legal
Economics," 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1155; Eric M. Fink, Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudential
Logic of Late Capitalism: A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Rise and Diffusion of Law and
Economics, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 931 (2004). More familiar, older works would include Guido
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211
(1991); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1980); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980); Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics,
86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988); Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The
Problem of Social Cost: A View From the Left, 1986 WIs. L. REV. 919; Pierre Schlag, The
Problem of Transaction Costs, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661 (1989). Now seemingly hoary old
classics in this line would include Arthur Alan Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974), and A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic
Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1671-81 (1974).
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no one knows how much of society is governed by them.93 As I hope is
obvious at this point, the aim of this critique is that that world of which I
have been speaking-the range of more or less formal and bureaucratized
entities making important allocations in society-is to some greater or
lesser degree exempt from market forces.
The common picture of "markets," in short, is that of economics as
neoclassical price theory or as a science of human choice. Namely, in all
sectors of human behavior not directly and effectively controlled by
government, the dominant category of social ordering conduct is believed
to be atomized, bilateral transactions between individuals, firms, or both.
"Firms" in this picture, while seemingly out of place in a model of
individuated market transactions, are really only contractual compromises
occasionally needed to align incentives and reduce costs that arise in messy
reality. Moreover, while it is recognized that certain other practical
realities frustrate the perfect functioning of this system, it has so far seemed
to triumph on the argument that the exogeneity of those market frailties
leaves the basic theoretical account of markets intact, and still a useful
depiction of society and guide for policy.
94
Now, only the most prosaic idolater of free markets is surprised that real-
world markets tend to accrete rules, standards and institutions, and courts
and economists now largely believe such things are actually quite healthy.95
93. Thus the following criticism may seem a little straw-mannish, in that it may seem to
attack a model economists themselves do not adopt-economics does not necessarily model
"markets" as free-standing institutions analogous to government agencies or business firms.
Indeed, economists do not seem to think much about what "markets" are, and rather just
assume their existence. In fact, it is probably quite wrong to claim that economists think of
them that way, as it confuses self-serving instincts themselves with the collection of rules,
standards, and structures needed in messy reality to make voluntary exchange work. Again,
though, the criticism here is not a criticism of price theory, but rather of the sociological
assumption that matters not constrained by traditional government are necessarily regulated
by market forces. Admittedly, some tension exists between this Article and that body of
economics arguing that many or all "non-market" transactions are explainable by price
theory. See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 53 (1985) (discussing "imperialist" economic forays into a range of non-market
interactions; introducing some criticisms, but finding ultimately that "[t]here is only one
social science" and that eventually "economics," as improved by integrations from other
disciplines, will "constitute the universal grammar of the social sciences."). Indeed, an
explicit claim here will be that price theory, as a model of individual choices, cannot explain
or predict events that occur under the influence of formally non-market social institutions.
The basic prediction in this Article is that in fact a huge range of social choices are now
made under such circumstances.
94. See Herbert A. Simon, Organizations and Markets, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (199 1)
("[Neoclassical price theory usually treats] [a]ccess to information, negotiation costs, and
opportunities for cheating.., as exogenous variables that do not themselves need to be
explained... [Their] exogeneity... allow[s] the theory to remain within the magical
domains of utility and profit maximization.").
95. Since the 1970s the courts have made clear that privately devised market rules and
market-facilitating institutions will be given wide latitude under antitrust and other law, at
least where they are needed or useful to the healthy functioning of markets. See, e.g., Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985)
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However, even admitting this as a regrettably necessary concession to the
costs of transactions, many social scientists seem to take for granted that
markets together comprise basically an atomistic universe of
individualized, efficiently incentivized, and predominantly low-cost
person-to-person transactions, which orchestrate society through
interactions between persons and firms and govern the internal organization
of firms themselves.
This all seems increasingly implausible. First, a little-recognized but in
fact profound empirical question goes normally unasked: Is it simply not
known how many choices in society are made through market processes?
96
The answer is that it is not. It finally has begun to be suggested, in the face
of centuries of orthodoxy, that individuated market transactions may be
neither all that common nor all that important in the actual organization of
society.97 Admittedly, neoclassical thought has devised a means by which
apparently non-market, intra-firm transactions can be brought within the
theory. As a commonplace of the so-called "neoinstitutional" or
(upholding restrictive membership rules of a retailer purchasing cooperative against antitrust
attack, noting that they were necessary to the cooperative arrangement, and that the
cooperative itself was useful to competition); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
441 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1979) (upholding a scheme of blanket licensing of the intellectual
property of songwriters against antitrust attack, and noting that the arrangement alleviated
otherwise prohibitive transaction costs and created the possibility of a market that otherwise
would not exist); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (upholding trade restraining terms in a contractual arrangement among household
moving companies, and finding it to be a net efficiency-enhancing "integration" of a number
of firms "by contract"); cf Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)
(concerning trading rules of a commodities exchange).
96. Of course, one easy, knee-jerk response is that they all are because choice always
necessarily implies the agency of individual human decisionmakers, and even if in some
particular transaction the individual does not formally represent his own interest, he still will
serve his own self-interested psychological instincts, perhaps at the expense of his
principal's interests. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 94, at 26 (characterizing the basic
neoclassical argument as "that a proper explanation of an economic phenomenon will
reduce it to maximizing behavior of parties who are engaged in contracting, given the
circumstances that surround the transaction"); Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm
as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171 (2002)
(asserting that the science of contract, in which parties align incentives and craft governance
structures attuned to their exchange needs, is another means to study economic phenomena).
But that is the whole point of the discussion here. The response is easy only if one first
assumes that no matter how complex some world of institutionalized decisionmaking
becomes, it can be explained by examining the individual motivations of some hypothesized
contracting parties who created it.
97. See, e.g., Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 147 (1983); Hanslowe, supra note 39, at 130 ("[I]t is plain that
substantial proportions of economic activity are presently not governed by rules that come
anywhere near approximating the power-neutralizing, classical, atomistically individualistic,
liberal, competitive model."); Ronald L. Jepperson & John W. Meyer, The Public Order and
the Construction of Formal Organizations, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 6, at
204; Simon, supra note 94, at 25 ("Counted by the head, most of the actors in a modem
economy are employees."); see also ALFRED DUPONT CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
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"transaction-cost" economics, when a firm resolves its make-or-buy choice
in favor of "make," it nevertheless makes the resulting, internal hierarchical
decisions exclusively as functions of negotiated contracts, which
themselves are driven by individual incentives of the contracting parties
who create or work within those firms, and are constrained only by
exogenous material circumstances. In other words, the same socially
optimizing forces that drive market transactions will drive the structure and
behavior of firms and all other private entities. Therefore, a theory of even
hegemonic firms in highly concentrated industries, which arrange some
very large portion of society's basic decisions through internal fiat
directives, can preserve almost undisturbed the centrality of markets and
exchanges.98
It was only natural that this model of formal organizations, driven by
rational choice theory, would be adapted to describe political decisions and
to public bureaucracies in particular,99 and that the posited "privatization"
choice would be modeled as the government's own "make-or-buy"
decision.100
98. See Simon, supra note 94, at 26-27. It is worth noting explicitly that most
transaction cost theorists see their theory of the firm as essentially an application of
neoclassical theory; this fact often seems to be misunderstood. See, e.g., OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 1
(1975) (describing his work as "complementary to, rather than a substitute for, conventional
analysis"); see also Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI.
739, 750 (1984) (describing most transaction cost theorists this way).
99. See generally Moe, supra note 98, at 758-66 (charting the then-nascent rise of
transaction-cost applications to politics and public bureaucracy, while being cautiously
optimistic about the movement's promise, despite concerns that important differences exist
between political organizations and the profit-motivated firms that were the traditional
subject of transaction-cost models).
100. Despite the general critique to follow, I think several recent works applying
transaction cost approaches offer important and promising insights. In particular, political
scientist John Donahue set out an encyclopedic tour of empirical evidence comparing public
and private service providers, see DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 57-78, 101-212, along with
careful analysis of their comparative institutional advantages, see id. at 79-98, 215-23, and
the observation that the make-or-buy decision for government service boils down to
consideration whether a particular function requires an input-based specification of public
needs (i.e., provision by civil servants) or could adequately be gotten by output-based
specification (i.e., from private sector providers), see id. at 45. A few other works have
begun the task of applying the make-or-buy analysis, including one article by Oliver
Williamson himself, see Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A
Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (1999), and work by
Professor Shapiro, see Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE
L.J. 389 (2003) (noting that the government has increasingly relied on the private sector to
make and implement regulatory policy); Sidney A. Shapiro, Matching Public Ends and
Private Means: Insights from the New Institutional Economics, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 43 (2002) (explaining that mechanisms to ensure private sector accountability are
limited). These works are more preliminary, however, and they are also somewhat
problematic. Namely, they fail to heed a warning from Terry Moe-that different sorts of
organizations might differ in several fundamental respects that render simple application of
transaction cost models ill-advised. See Terry Moe, Politics and the Theory of
Organization, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 106, 120-28 (1991). For example, despite his familiarity
with Moe's work, Professor Shapiro explicitly chose to "assume that agency officials will
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This approach has some serious problems. The most overwhelming and
obvious problem is the profound number, range and complexity of
institutions the model would attempt to explain as the conscious design of
rationally maximizing individuals. 01  But maybe a larger problem
conceptually is the model's implicit assumption that any formal association
can be understood to have or serve some comparatively simple purpose,
which by implication of the model necessarily maximizes the interests of
those who form the organization. This might sometimes make some sense,
as in a profit-maximizing business firm or an ad hoc product design
consortium established by competing manufacturers. Very often, however,
it will not. Often, the activities of a formal association will pose only
highly uncertain or ambiguous welfare payoffs for its participants. Often,
the various participants will have highly differing motives with respect to
the organization's activities. Indeed, frequently individual participants may
come to understand their interests in the organization only during the
course of participation, and therefore could hardly maximize those goals
during some period of contractual formation. 10 2 It also would seem simply
inaccurate to characterize the evolution and accretion of all social entities
with decisionmaking power as deliberate creations of individuals or firms.
Institutions arise too organically for them all to be characterized as
creatures of contract, even broadly defined. As a separate matter, price
theoretic explanations of individual behavior will have little explanatory
power of the behavior of actors within many formal institutions. Actors
adopt institutional arrangements that promote legislative goals at the lowest transaction
cost," and adopts as his purpose "to identify[] how transaction cost analysis would assist an
administrator who seeks to determine in good faith when it is advisable to involve private
parties in the implementation of regulation." Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation,
supra, at 399-400. The remainder of his article consists of "a typology of government-
private relationships," many of which already exist, and an argument that "these choices
constitute the same type of make-or-buy decision that economic actors confront .... " Id. at
400. Professor Williamson, for his part, argues that in evaluating privatization choices,
governments must weigh "probity" along with more straightforward efficiency concerns.
However, he too seems to take government "purposes" as essentially simple and
unambiguous. Incidentally, both Shapiro's and Williamson's works arguably are fairly
duplicative of Donahue's earlier and more comprehensive work; Shapiro distinguishes it by
arguing that Donahue focused only on non-regulatory functions, whereas Shapiro is
concerned with the outsourcing of actual regulation. See id. at 414-15 & n.92. However,
the analysis Shapiro sets out still resembles Donahue's quite closely, insofar as it merely
analyzes relative institutional advantages as between public and private regulatory work.
Williamson seems to have been unaware of Donahue's work.
101. Admittedly, transaction-cost approaches attempt to accommodate the imperfection
of human ability to contract-indeed, it assumes as a basic premise that all contracts are
incomplete as a result of human bounded rationality. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 100,
at 311. A great proportion of work in this area is devoted to strategies for organizational
design that better addresses contracting inadequacies.
102. See Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with
Political Science, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 293, 295 (1985) (noting that under realistic models
of human problem solving, actors may even discover what their goals are in the course of
the problem-solving process).
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within those bureaucracies act subject both to restraints of the institutions'
rules and norms, and they only rarely will exercise authority within their
institutional roles solely for their own unambiguous benefit. Therefore,
price theoretic models of individual or firm choice seem unlikely to explain
either the "contractual" constraints of social decisionmaking institutions or
the behavior of actors within them.
Finally, such a view again would have to remain uncritically committed
to purely formal distinctions, this time between different "firms." "Firms"
need not be understood, as they commonly are in both price theory and
neoinstitutionalist economics, as hermetically differentiated entities that
relate to one another only through unmediated market transactions. Indeed,
deciding which components make up an "organization," however obvious
it may seem in any particular case, is to some extent a bit of a nonsense
exercise and an unnecessary one. Situations are easy to imagine in which
purportedly distinct firms cooperate or interact so as to be no more than
formally distinct, at least as to particular transactions.' 0 3 Indeed, antitrust,
administrative, and constitutional law now broadly permit private
regulation of nearly the whole range of human affairs-even by
collaborations of horizontal trade competitors-and the United States
economy has been pervasively so governed for a long time. 04 Thus,
"markets," such as they are, in fact are regulated directly through layers of
bureaucracy that differ from "government bureaucracy" only in the legal
instruments by which they are constituted and constrained, and in their
permissible incentives. Bureaucratization is accomplished not only by the
oligopolistic fiat of large firms in concentrated industries, but also by
collaborations of firms, including standard-setting ventures or product
design consortia. Moreover, even where the law would prohibit direct
market constraints by distinct "firms" acting in horizontal coalition,
nominally distinct firms often can accomplish the same thing by
consolidation or joint venture.
Thus, even the one area of significant market activity left open to most
human individuals-frequent small and infrequent large retail purchases of
consumer goods and services-is in fact mediated not only by our system's
103. Simon understated it in a pioneer work when he said that
[i]n complex enterprises the definition of the unit is not unambiguous-a whole
agency, a bureau, or even a section in a large department may be regarded as an
organization .... [T]he smallest multi-person units are the primary groups; the
largest are institutions (e.g., 'the economic system,' 'the state') and whole societies.
Herbert A. Simon, Comments on the Theory of Organizations, 46 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1130,
1130 (1952).
104. See Sagers, Legal Structure, supra note 6, at 952-53 (discussing the legal treatment
undercurrent law of nominally private entities with regulatory functions); cf Sagers, Case
Study, supra note 6, at 1398-1402 (discussing the range of "standard setting" activities by
which nominally private organizations currently regulate much of human activity).
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large number of official laws, but by a whole shadowy universe of
constraints imposed hierarchically within firms and collaboratively across
formal institutions of various kinds. None of this "private" regulation
could be modeled to fit the neoclassical vision of atomized market conduct
without substantially multiplying the number of assumptions needed for the
theory to remain genuinely a work of price theory. 0 5  Therefore, it is
increasingly hard to see how there even are such things as "markets" as
traditionally understood.
In other words, the critique here is that "markets" can be understood as a
meaningful regulatory alternative to traditional "government" only if we
assume that the structure and behavior of all nominally "private"
institutions with power over social choices can be explained by examining
the personal choices of the individuals who create them by contract (thus
analogizing them to "firms" in neoinstitutionalist economics). In light of
the range and complexity of such institutions, however, this must sooner or
later seem hopeless even to very conservative economic thinkers.
This critique is not entirely new. It builds not only on Herbert Simon's
careful critique of neoinstitutionalist economics 10 6 and on the recent "new
institutionalism" in sociology and organization theory, 0 7 but it was also
important to the original American Institutionalists to examine the actual
organs of economic decisionmaking, even to the extent they accepted price
theory for its own sake. 
108
105. Moreover, in addition to all of these more formal constraints, even the most
individuated of consumer market transactions are mediated by hugely well funded and well
researched marketing efforts that, as a major purpose of their very being, exploit market
dysfunction and systematic consumer irrationalities. But this and other observations about
demand and rationality really go to price theory itself as a psychological model of individual
choice.
106. See supra notes 96, 100, 102, 104, 108-09.
107. See Jepperson, supra note 6, at 1 (charting the development of this movement and
its general critique of atomistic, rational-actor models of social phenomena, its general
disregard for the importance of institutions, and its confidence in the intentionality of
organizations).
108. See, e.g., Allan G. Gruchy et al., Discussion, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 13, 13-15 (1957)
(summarizing the main goals of the Institutionalists). It may be that the Institutionalists
have been fairly criticized for lack of analytical rigor. See Kenneth E. Boulding,
Institutional Economics: A New Look at Institutionalism, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9-10 (1957)
(asserting that the original institutionalists offered correct criticisms of contemporary
economic thought, but not the correct answers).
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE MACROSOCIAL WHAT AND THE
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL WH, ALSO, ALAS, A BIT OF ABJECT
MALTHUSIANISM
There remains, then, a need for an alternative theoretical account of the
current world of human governance, to which the preceding arguments
have all been leading. First, there looms the question of the macrosocial
what-how exactly it is that values are apportioned in society-and the
question of just how that phenomenon might be changing. I think the
picture generally adopted of these matters, both in the privatization
literature and more generally, is inaccurate.
The conventional vision of governance and how it is changing appears to
be something like this: Traditional "government," composed of entities
created through authoritative legal instruments, makes and enforces policy
through authoritative announcements ("law") and through provision of
goods and services. Individuals and non-state associations participate in
various ways, some of which may be unwholesome, but actions of
government ultimately are institutionally distinct from outside influence.
Forces also exist in society outside this public sphere. A comparatively
minor, non-theorizable component of non-state social ordering consists of
social values, norms, customs, and rules of voluntary associations; these
phenomena have some complex but essentially subordinate relationship to
state ordering. A much more important aspect of non-state ordering, which
regulates most human behavior that is not directly controlled by the state, is
the world of market transactions. The market is unlike other non-state
forces in that it is not very formally institutionalized in itself, it does not
reflect any malleable, historically contingent social development, and it is
not likely to be consciously varied in its operations through mere human
intervention. Rather, the market is the cumulative product of inalienable
human physical and psychological attributes and it operates automatically.
It is the invisible hand.
On this view of human governance, a conscious choice by a government
actor to provide a good or service via some nominally private entity is
interesting mainly in that it might result in inefficiencies or defects in
democratic desiderata.
In fact, a very different story can be told, using very different imagery.
Traditionally constituted entities of "government" might constitute one and
perhaps quite a small component of a (very roughly) horizontal,
heterarchical range of focused points of influence. It exercises influence in
part through legal pronouncements that work in the bad-man manner-they
constrain the behavior of judges who act as gatekeepers on official
coercion. Those pronouncements have at best a complicated relationship
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with other social phenomena. Acting along with government in this
heterarchical range is a limitless array of human associations and
institutions, which exist along a continuum from the unorganized and even
unconscious to the highly organized and government-like. Among the
powers they represent are matters beyond law-like or regulatory
prescriptions, including peculiar agenda-setting phenomena that are
themselves a source of power. 10 9 Finally, acting among these influences
are forces of systematic self-service that in the aggregate have some
resource allocational influence. However, such "market" influences, to the
extent that they exist, must be understood at a minimum to be highly
mediated by state and non-state constraints. That is, given a range of
options left open after other forces in society have already limited the
possible options (and possibly modified the range of choices
psychologically by modifying demand and limiting perceived options), an
actor still may choose the behavior that maximizes its own welfare. The
"market" on this view seems less like an independent, largely autonomous
player in a vertically arranged hierarchy of governance bodies, and more
like a piecemeal collection of interstitial influences weaving their way here
and there through constraints set in other ways.
Within this alternative model of governance, "privatizing" changes that
occur within traditionally constituted government entities could also be
described differently than in the more familiar version. One of the more
surprising insights in this study arises at this point.
First, it was mentioned above that United States governments have not
actually given away some large range of functions they once performed, as
is implied in much privatization rhetoric."l 0 What has not yet been
observed is that in fact United States governments have in some sense
come to be responsible for inestimably more of society's functions than
they once were, and most of that development has occurred in just the past
few decades of allegedly ubiquitous privatization. This has occurred in
some part because of the well-known expansion of federal regulation
beginning in the 1960s, but more importantly it has occurred through the
109. Among government actors, the agenda-setting process was described in the
influential JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1995). As for
the "power" implied in agenda-setting, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz observed in a set
of studies in the 1960s that a source of social authority is the power to designate some topics
the proper subject of controversy and rule others off the table. See Peter Bachrach
& Morton S. Baratz, Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework, 57 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 632 (1963); Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 947 (1962). To that end, they quote Schattschneider: "All forms of political
organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the
suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are
organized into politics while others are organized out." Id. at 949 (quoting E. E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 71 (1960)).
110. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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enormous growth of the government's contract bureaucracy. Whatever
sense in which it seems that functions given to contractors have been
"privatized" is purely semantic. While it may be true that government
treasuries now funnel a larger proportion of tax dollars through formally
non-state vessels, they remain tax dollars distributed nominally under the
supervision of oath-taking and government-paid bureaucrats and for
purposes specified by bodies that in theory are democratically
accountable. 11  This is an example of the problem this Article has
explored: If one disregards the critique of the public-private distinction, it
can be said that "government" no longer provides these outsourced
functions. But that formulation reduces away most of the sociological
reality here that is really interesting.
Second, this evolving institutional structure of traditional government
has been a "conscious" phenomenon only in the most attenuated sense. In
part, it occurred through a disaggregated collection of generally unrelated
policy initiatives scattered throughout United States law and adopted
throughout the twentieth century, almost all of which were invisible to the
public and were visible in government only to those directly involved in
specific programs.' 2 In even larger part, it reflects the expansion of the
111. Despite the ethos of "shrinking government" in which privatization rhetoric is
wrapped, no one within government could really believe that government has gotten
smaller. On the contrary, as many within the Beltway acknowledge, the rhetoric of
"shrinking government" is tremendously misleading. The body of workers paid directly or
indirectly via federal tax revenues or required by unfunded mandates is enormous and has
grown much larger just since the late 1990s. The best regarded study concerning the true
size of the government-co-sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Wagner School
of Public Service at New York University-shows that while politicians have continually
congratulated their own efforts to shrink the government, the true size of the federal work
force has actually grown substantially, especially since about 1999. While the formal, on-
paper civil service has shrunk, the actual number of jobs for which the federal government
and tax dollars are responsible-including jobs required by contracts, grants, and those state
and local jobs required by federal mandates-is estimated at about 17 million. See Light,
supra note 57, at 311-13.
112. These initiatives are numerous, sundry, and not much connected to one another.
They include: (1) OMB Circular No. A-76, a policy dating to the Eisenhower
Administration under which the federal government is theoretically barred from competing
with the private sector in the provision of "commercial" goods or services, see supra note 5;
(2) the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112
Stat. 2382 (1998), (presently codified at the note following 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2000)), or
"FAIR Act," which requires an annual accounting of all government functions that are
"commercial," and is at least theoretically given teeth by the injunction of OMB Circular
No. A-76 that agencies out-source commercial functions; and (3) a lengthy, century-long
series of loosely connected federal policy steps to encourage private standard setting and to
keep government entities out of the regulation of safety and design, including the
government's role in nurturing the nominally private but very powerful American National
Standards Institute, and adoption of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (presently codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a(a)(1)(B) (2000)), which among other things shielded standard setting entities from a
proposed FTC rulemaking. Among the most surprising of these steps might be the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775
(1996), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 272 note, and implemented through OMB Circular No. A-
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contract bureaucracy, and to this extent it occurred as a default or
compromise, and again was not part of any overall plan. To some limited
extent, it was part of a faitly conscious Cold War effort of the federal
government to grow its defense capacities while escaping public
attention," 3 but in recent years it appears much more commonly to have
occurred as a last resort of front-line government managers simultaneously
facing dwindling resources, public outcry against alleged "waste," and
legislative demands for more services. 1 4 Contracting out can allow the
bureaucrat to satisfy performance demands with expenditures that are much
less publicly visible." 5 In any event, while government has largely lacked
any overall vision of these events, 1 6 their practical effect has been greatly
to expand the range of nominally private entities that are able to exploit
bilateral power asymmetry."17
It seems likely that these trends will bear regrettable fruit. As is
increasingly acknowledged by representatives of traditional government
and others, government in recent decades literally has begun losing its
ability to perform its own nominal functions. Its own contract bureaucracy
has grown unmanageably large (to the extent that several federal agencies
now admit they no longer know how many contractors they oversee), while
government's own in-house managerial capacity has been decimated.' 18
119. See 63 Fed. Reg. 8546 (Feb. 10, 1998). The NTTAA mandates that federal agencies
use appropriate private standards both in procurement and regulation, every time such a
standard exists.
113. See generally Guttman, Governance by Contract, supra note 36. Congressional
desire in this respect is easy to understand-any politician, of any persuasion and with any
constituency, can benefit by providing better services and can suffer by causing increased
taxes. The executive desire is more interesting-it appears to have arisen not from any
executive desire for power or political favor. Rather, front-line bureaucrats have, since at
least the 1940s, found themselves faced simultaneously with ever-increasing congressional
demands for service provision, on the one hand, and ever tighter controls on expenditures,
on the other. See GUTrMAN & WILLNER, supra note 25.
114. See generally GUTTMAN & WILLNER, supra note 25.
115. Government can grow itself without accountability in this way because government
contractor employees are not normally counted in tallies of the federal workforce and
because there is no easily accessed means for accounting even for how many government
contracts are in existence. Thus, an agency could take on additional responsibilities
performed by civil service protected agency employees only with easy public accountability.
By contracting the work out, however, the agency can claim to have provided additional
public services without increasing the civil service workforce and without easily traceable
public expenditures. See GUTTMAN & WILLNER, supra note 25.
116. The Government Accountability Office has tried to fill that gap. See GAO,
COMPETITIVE SOURCING: GREATER EMPHASIS NEEDED ON INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (2004); GAO, CIVIL SERVANTS AND CONTRACT EMPLOYEES: WHO
SHOULD Do WHAT FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? (1981).
117. For example, under the NTTAA, discussed, supra note 112, a standard setting body
can constrain the behavior of its members and the industries or conduct within its purview
not only through the persuasive power of its opinion but also because its opinion will be
incorporated both in government regulatory rules and in government procurement
specifications.
118. A bitter irony of recent downsizing efforts is that they have simultaneously
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But the more important point, again, is that even this story is only one
comparatively small piece of the overall picture of governance. Even those
"private" entities whose social allocational influence comes from some
legally formal relationship with government are only a portion of the
overall complex of social ordering.
Thus, a picture of the macrosocial what could be adduced that is quite
different from the picture of things contained in ordinary privatization talk.
Again, in the popular imagination a sharp distinction divides "bureaucracy"
and individualized market transactions. "Privatizing," especially in recent
political rhetoric, means removing a function from "bureaucracy" and
ceding it to the self-optimizing world of atomistic, highly incentivized
competition. A better picture of the basic choice for allocation of social
goods is between one kind of bureaucracy (government) or a different kind
of bureaucracy (business organizations and other non-state rationalizing
entities, some of which have some formal tie to traditional "government,"
but most of which do not). "Privatization" on this view is merely a shifting
of personnel and flows of resources. It may rearrange incentives and
alliances, but it is not a fundamental change in metaphysical character.
In any event, this leaves the matter of the historiographical why-why
institutions have evolved in this manner and why both public and academic
visions of them seem so misleading. This question seems much more
speculative. As for the practical question of why institutions have evolved
as they have, the location of social rationalization exclusively in
bureaucracies seems mainly a compromise with brute practical
circumstances-bounded human rationality, scarce resources, and
expansions both in population and technology. The fullest and best
theoretical treatment of this phenomenon is by sociologists Paul DiMaggio
and Walter Powell, who argue that "the engine of organizational
rationalization has shifted" from the desire for efficient markets to
"individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint,"
efforts that take place within organizations of "key suppliers, resource and
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that
produce similar services or products."" 9 Moreover, they argue that these
social institutions-these "efforts to deal rationally" with circumstances-
seem to grow more similar over time, which reflects something important
demanded: (1) reduction of civil service employees, including procurement officials, and
(2) outplacement of the formerly civil service government services through procurement
contracts. In other words, at the same time that government has been laying off its
procurement officers, it has hugely increased the burden of oversight work that is supposed
to be done by procurement officers. See Steven L. Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy:
More Sail Than Rudder?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263, 284-85 (2004).
119. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 97, at 147-548. Another excellent source is Marc
A. Olshan, Standards-Making Organizations and the Rationalization of American Life, 34
Soc. Q. 319 (1993).
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about society. Admitting that some of this "isomorphism" of organizations
could be explained by competitive forces, as has been suggested
elsewhere, 120  DiMaggio and Powell argue that much institutional
isomorphism has become disconnected from the rationalizing influence of
market competition. A larger implication of their work is that as
institutions themselves come to have greater independent rationalizing
force-as they grow in their bilateral power asymmetry vis-A-vis natural
persons and other organizations-they increasingly displace the regulatory
importance either of traditional government institutions or market
pressures.
As for the psychological-the historiographical question of why people
seem so reluctant to discard the image of governance divided between
government bureaucracy and free markets-this too is mysterious and
contested. Among historians, explanations abound for our domestic
romance of the private; chief candidates are the Framers' fear of royal
power121 and their experience as colonists and pioneers in a new world.
122
But again it also must reflect very basic perceptions and political desires of
contemporary Americans, which are ambiguous and not ideologically
specific. To doubt a robust distinction of public and private and the would-
be corollary of free markets obviously threatens conservative or libertarian
individualism, but it also threatens progressive confidence in regulatory
120. That is, in commercial markets firms are pressured by competition to choose
organizational forms that give the greatest productive efficiency, and over time will tend
toward the form that is most efficient. Notably, Alfred Dupont Chandler argued that
organizational efficiencies explained the rise of managerial bureaucracy and the so-called
"great merger movement," see CHANDLER, supra note 97, and economists of various stripes
have made essentially similar arguments, see, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Williamson, supra note
100. The origin of these arguments is Coase. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386,398-401 (1937).
121. See FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1985). Historiographical debate has raged recently over whether the
founding generation was genuinely individualistic in this sense, and it is said that in fact
they held "republican" or some other generally communal views up until the turn of the
nineteenth century. Explanations vary for founding-era republicanism, centering mainly on
the philosophical predilections of the Founders, see, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975), or the religion of the mass of Americans, see BARRY ALAN
SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1994). However, no serious disagreement exists that sometime in the
early nineteenth century American political desiderata turned predominantly individualist
and liberal in nature, and that we have never as a people turned back.
122. Daniel Boorstin describes a pragmatic individualism even in colonial America that
led, among other things to a confidence in individual industry and distrust of the highly
theorized European mercantilism of the day. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS:
THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 152-58 (1958). He attributes the rise of this thinking to the "self
evidence" of American experience in the colonies, during which population and material
well-being expanded at great speed and for long periods. The colonists' ongoing success
through self-reliant private industry made them skeptical of Old World models of
government. See id.
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oversight by democratic and public-regarding government institutions. In
short, the vision of governance built into the privatization literature is a
moral aspiration, not an empirical observation. That it might also happen
to be false would not prevent it from seeming indispensable to most.
CONCLUSION
In summary, then, while it seems difficult to explain exactly why, the
contemporary relationship of "public" and "private" seems quite different
than that normally implied in "privatization" talk. If anything is
meaningfully changing in society, the change is neither recent nor
contained in the favored institutional arrangements of American
bureaucrats of the late twentieth century. Rather, it seems much larger than
those policy predilections and older-indeed much older-in that it reflects
matters dating to the origins of Western capitalism in, say, the fifteenth
century. The ancient and ongoing change is embodied in two very broad
propositions, which I have been at pains to stress in this Article: First, that
to the extent that they ever had even heuristic meaning, the distinctions
between "public" and "private," and the corollary distinction between
"law" and "non-law," are increasingly irrelevant. Second, that to the extent
that they ever existed, it is increasingly the case that "free" markets no
longer exist.
The consequence of these two propositions is that under the current state
of human governance, the location of influence and decisionmaking for
allocation of social goods normally must be within either one kind of
bureaucracy (traditional government) or another (business firms or other
non-state organizations). The only robust and meaningful difference
between them is that one of them lacks even a nominal obligation to the
public interest.
None of this is necessarily, unequivocally bad. Rationalization of social
goods through non-state associations, however they happen to be
organized, is not necessarily worse than rationalization through government
direction or through markets and efficiently incentivized firms. However,
that such a state of affairs has come to pass might suggest something about
the material orientation of our development as a society. For whatever
reason-one perhaps overly obvious explanation would involve
technological change and population growth-our governance institutions
have come to be organized in a way quite at odds with all aspects of the
liberal individualism that has been our core political philosophy since at
least the presidency of Thomas Jefferson. We have evolved to a state in
which neither the individual franchise nor individual buying and selling
decisions have any real significance at all, and all individual decisions are
constrained by an astonishing array of restrictions set in ways that are
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neither democratic nor efficiently incentivized. That such a thing has
evolved, and that it has come about despite human intentions, might
suggest that a complicated society with advanced technology and a large
population is simply ill-suited for democratic capitalism.
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